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USING OUTCOMES TO REFRAME
GUILTY PLEA ADJUDICATION
Anne R. Traum*
Abstract
The Supreme Court’s 2012 decisions in Lafler v. Cooper and
Missouri v. Frye lay the groundwork for a new approach to judicial
oversight of guilty pleas that considers outcomes. These cases confirm
that courts possess robust authority to protect defendants’ Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel and that plea
outcomes are particularly relevant to identifying and remedying
prejudicial ineffective assistance in plea-bargaining. The Court’s
reliance on outcome-based prejudice analysis and suggestions for trial
court-level reforms to prevent Sixth Amendment violations set the stage
for trial courts to take a more active, substantive role in regulating guilty
pleas.
This Article traces these significant doctrinal shifts and argues that
they supply both impetus and authority for trial courts to regulate guilty
pleas by monitoring plea outcomes. This proposal builds on marketbased concepts while strengthening the judicial role in safeguarding
constitutional values. By monitoring outcomes, courts can detect and
correct factors in the plea-bargaining market, such as prosecutorial
overreaching and ineffective defense counsel, which can distort the
parties’ ability to negotiate fair results. Outcomes monitoring is justified
for practical reasons because it builds on courts’ expertise and unique
place in the plea markets, it can be implemented at the trial court level,
it reinforces courts’ traditional sentencing authority, and it can prevent
litigation of prejudicial ineffective assistance in post-conviction
proceedings.
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 824
I.

THE COURT’S PROCEDURAL APPROACH ................................ 829
A. Regulating the Validity of a Guilty Plea ....................... 830
B. Regulating Defense Counsel in the Plea Phase ............ 836
C. Frye and Lafler: Incorporating Outcomes
Analysis ......................................................................... 841

* Associate Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. Dean John Valery White, Interim Dean Nancy Rapoport, and Dean Daniel W. Hamilton
provided financial support for this project. I am grateful for comments and encouragement from
Stephanos Bibas, Laura Appleman, G. Jack Chin, Sam Kamin, Justin Marceau, Carissa Hessick,
Shima Baradaran, Angela J. Davis, Jenny Roberts, Bret Birdsong, and participants in the
Southwest Criminal Law Conference, and the ABA-AALS Criminal Justice Section Academic
Workshop. Thanks to Wade Beavers for research assistance.
823

824

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

1.

Delinking Strickland and Due Process ................... 842
a. Claiming Strickland, Not Hill ......................... 842
b. Strickland as an Independent
Basis for Relief ............................................... 844
2. Measuring Prejudice Based on Outcomes .............. 846
3. Remedying and Preventing Lawyer
Incompetence ......................................................... 850
D. Toward Outcome-Based Regulation ............................. 851
II.

RETHINKING APPROACHES TO REFORM ................................. 852
A. Plea-Bargaining Eats Everything ................................. 853
1. The Adaptability of Plea-Bargaining ..................... 853
2. Institutional Players and Their Incentives .............. 857
B. Approaches to Reform ................................................... 859
1. Constitutional Reformers ....................................... 862
2. Market-Based Reformers ....................................... 864
a. Reinforcing Shared Incentives ........................ 864
b. Ensuring Market Prices ................................... 867

III.

MONITORING OUTCOMES IN THE TRIAL COURT .................... 869
A. Trial Court Authority..................................................... 870
B. A Blueprint for Monitoring............................................ 873

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 878
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has signaled with its recent decisions in Lafler v.
Cooper1 and Missouri v. Frye2 that its approach to judicial oversight of
guilty pleas may be changing. In these cases, the Court for the first time
looked to the outcome of the case—that is, the conviction and
sentence—as critical to its analysis under Strickland v. Washington.3
While technically these cases focused on incompetent defense counsel
during plea-bargaining, their significance is broader. The Court appears
to have recognized a need for greater regulation of plea-bargaining,
considered procedural fairness (not just a reliable guilt determination) as
a constitutional value, and relied on case outcomes to measure
prejudice. These developments are key to the broader task of reframing
guilty plea adjudication in ways that are practical and enhance
constitutional norms.
To appreciate their significance, it is necessary to situate Lafler and
1. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
2. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
3. 466 U.S. 668, 687–96 (1984).
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Frye in the broader, complex setting of our modern criminal justice
system.4 Today, more defendants than ever before pass through the
criminal justice system, are incarcerated, serve longer sentences, are
subject to supervision, and experience lasting collateral consequences.5
A key feature of this “system” is that prosecutors enjoy enormous
power not only to control what criminal cases are prosecuted, but also to
dictate through their charging and plea-bargaining decisions how cases
are resolved in terms of guilt and sentencing.6 Substantive and
procedural developments in the law have contributed to this growth in
the system. Prosecutors gained a substantive edge through the
enactment of tough drug laws and recidivist enhancements, greater
reliance on prison sentences, and changes in sentencing law that
constrained or even eliminated judicial discretion at sentencing.7 On the
procedural side, prosecutors could use the threat of more serious
charges or a reward of leniency to induce guilty pleas.8
Together, these factors have contributed to higher guilty plea rates,
especially because defendants who opt for trial typically face more
serious charges with more severe sentencing consequences.9 Lafler is an
4. Some scholars hail Lafler and Frye as landmark decisions, while others are more
skeptical. Compare Justin F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1161, 1161 (2012) (describing Lafler and Frye as the dawn of a
“new era”), with Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering
Wound, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 673, 678–79 (2013) (expressing skepticism about their significance).
5. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 4, 11 (2010) (analogizing the racialized aspects of mass incarceration to
historical features of racial segregation); David Garland, Introduction: The Meaning of Mass
Imprisonment, in MASS IMPRISONMENT 1, 1–2 (David Garland ed., 2001); Marc Mauer, The
Cases and Consequences of Prison Growth in the United States, in MASS IMPRISONMENT, supra,
at 4, 6 (citing record numbers of drug arrests, and mandatory prison sentences at the federal and
state levels); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything Is
a Crime, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 102, 104 (2013); Robert Weisberg & Joan Petersilia, The
Dangers of Pyrrhic Victories Against Mass Incarceration, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 124,
124.
6. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97
MINN. L. REV. 1, 8–9, 11 (2012) (describing how prosecutors control sentencing outcomes
through charging and charge bargaining).
7. See Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 429–30
(2013) (summarizing policies that led to more prosecutions and longer prison sentences).
8. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360–61, 365 (1978) (holding that the
prosecutor did not violate due process by carrying out a threat to charge an offense carrying a
mandatory life sentence after the defendant rejected a more lenient plea offer).
9. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Rachel E. Barkow,
Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1034 (2006)) (citing
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS ONLINE tbl. 5.22.2009, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222009.
pdf; SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 226846, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE
COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/fssc06st.pdf).
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example: After the defendant rejected a plea, he was convicted by a jury
and received a sentence that was 3.5 times longer than the sentence he
would have received with a guilty plea.10 High guilty plea rates allow
prosecutors to efficiently handle a high-volume practice with very few
trials, no juries, and minimal judicial oversight.11
The Supreme Court in Lafler recognized that today our criminal
justice system “is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of
trials.”12 As a factual matter, this “system” has been the reality for a
century.13 What is remarkable is that, with this statement, the Court has
framed the major task ahead of reorienting constitutional criminal law
to fit that reality. Currently, our “system of pleas” largely exists in a
constitutional vacuum in which few plea-specific protections exist and
none specifically address whether the defendant is receiving a fair
deal.14 There is a wide gap between the elaborate protections afforded
defendants at trial, and the bare-bones, “hands-off” process defendants
receive when pleading guilty.15 Increasing regulation of guilty plea
adjudication will necessarily require adapting or blending attributes
from these two “systems.”
Most constitutional criminal rights are procedural in nature and
protect defendants at trial.16 These trial-focused protections evolved in a
bygone era when trials were more common, prosecutions and
incarceration rates were dramatically lower, and judges enjoyed
virtually unfettered, unreviewable discretion to impose sentences.17
Constitutional protections aimed to ensure that the trial was fair, that the
jury’s verdict was accorded utmost respect, and that judges acted as

10. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383, 1391 (2012).
11. See Stephanos Bibas, Taming Negotiated Justice, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 35, 35 (2012)
(describing how the Supreme Court has “blessed plea bargaining as a speedy, efficient way to
clear congested dockets”).
12. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388.
13. See infra Subsection II.A.1.
14. See Stephanos Bibas, The Myth of the Fully Informed Rational Actor, 31 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 79, 79 (2011).
15. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the defendant’s jury
trial as the “exorbitant gold standard of American justice—a full-dress criminal trial with its
innumerable constitutional and statutory limitations”); Bibas, supra note 15, at 79 (“[T]he Court
has taken a laissez-faire, hands-off approach, assuming that plea bargaining is a rational and
well-functioning market in which price signals obviate regulation.”).
16. See generally WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
196–215 (2011) (describing the Supreme Court’s development of constitutional criminal
procedure in the 1960s).
17. See id. at 39 (describing how fifty years ago, jury trials were “cheap,” “reasonably
effective,” and “common”); Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of
Sentencing Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008) (noting that, until recent decades, appellate
review of sentencing decisions “was non-existent in most cases”).
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referees during trial with the final say on sentencing.18 To be sure, this
procedural focus has its champions and critics.19 While imperfect, this
elaborate procedural structure is an expression of core constitutional
values about the limits of government power, the roles of judge and jury
as checks on the government, and the norms of fairness, justice, and
proportionality.
In the system of pleas, there is no complementary, robust scheme of
protections or expression of constitutional norms. In guilty plea
adjudication, defendants do not so much exercise constitutional rights as
convert them to bargaining chips to use in the plea-bargaining process.20
By pleading guilty, a defendant waives his trial rights in return for a
more certain, less severe outcome.21 As Professor Stephanos Bibas
writes, the Supreme Court has taken a “laissez-faire, hands-off
approach” to regulating plea-bargaining, in which courts play a
perfunctory role in approving deals that are negotiated privately by the
parties.22
Plea-bargaining itself is complicated: It is ruled by institutional
insiders, namely, prosecutors and defense counsel; many defendants are
at the mercy of overburdened, underfunded appointed counsel; and
defendants may lack access to important information about their plea
options or find it difficult to weigh whether to accept a plea deal or risk
trial.23 Despite the complexity of this process, court oversight is
18. See Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 122 (2009) (“The jury’s deliberations are
secret and not subject to outside examination.”); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)
(establishing a high bar for reversal of a jury verdict based on insufficiency of the evidence);
Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at Sentencing,
99 CALIF. L. REV. 47, 49 (2011) (observing that sentencing protections receive less attention
than trial-focused constitutional protections).
19. See, e.g., Steven J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and
Constitutional Rights, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1045–47 (2013) (reviewing STUNTZ, supra note
16) (contrasting Stuntz’s “blistering indictment” of the “Warren Court[’s] revolution in criminal
procedure,” and the indispensable role of court-enforced procedural safeguards in protecting
liberty).
20. See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 1066 (2000)
(“[E]very new right [conferred by the courts] supplied a new axis along which a bargain could
be struck.”); see also Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms,
126 HARV. L. REV. 150, 172 (“The Warren Court’s failing was inventing gold-plated rules for
criminal trials when in fact most defendants can and do waive those trial rights quite easily.”).
21. Fisher, supra note 20, at 965.
22. Bibas, supra note 14, at 79.
23. See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 30–33 (2012)
[hereinafter BIBAS, MACHINERY] (describing the dominance of institutional repeat players,
namely prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges); Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the PleaBargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117,
1153–59 (2011) [hereinafter Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market] (describing
measures that would assist defendants in better understanding their plea options and related
consequences); John H. Blume, Plea Bargaining and the Right to the Effective Assistance of
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typically limited to determining whether the defendant understands the
terms of the deal he is accepting and the rights he is waiving.24
Lafler and Frye begin the task of normalizing guilty plea
adjudication within our existing constitutional framework. This Article
traces this important shift at a doctrinal level, and examines how these
cases provide a pathway for more robust judicial oversight of guilty
pleas. Four features of this doctrinal shift are especially important to the
broader project of reframing guilty plea adjudication. First, the Court
recognized that ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea stage is
actionable error in its own right, even if the resulting conviction is
otherwise valid. Second, the Court applied an outcomes-based prejudice
analysis to determine whether counsel’s deficient performance caused
the defendant to be worse off. Third, the Court suggested that a
prosecutor could be ordered to reoffer an earlier plea deal to remedy a
constitutional violation. And finally, the Court suggested that trial
courts could do more to prevent prejudicial error by counsel at the trial
stage.
This Article shows how Lafler and Frye create pathways for judicial
oversight of plea outcomes at the trial stage under the Sixth Amendment
and based on separation of powers concerns. Part I describes the Court’s
traditional procedural, outcome-neutral approach to regulation of pleas
under the Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, and its recent shifts in thinking on guilty plea adjudication
reflected in Lafler and Frye. Part II places reform of guilty plea
adjudication into a broader context by considering plea market features
and proposals for reform. Plea-bargaining is deeply entrenched, mostly
unregulated, and highly adaptive. This means that increased oversight of
guilty pleas may change the substantive outcome of particular cases, but
is unlikely (absent other changes) to alter the overall rate of pleas.
Proposals to reform or better regulate guilty pleas tend either to insist on
the need for strengthening constitutional protections or procedures, or to
build on the market model in which prosecutors and defendants are
viewed as rational actors freely bargaining to acceptable results. Finally,
Part III proposes that courts should monitor guilty plea outcomes to
safeguard separation of powers and Sixth Amendment concerns and
describes how courts might implement this approach. This proposal
situates judges as constitutional actors in the plea market with authority
to ensure that outcomes are not unfairly distorted by prosecutorial
advantage or ineffective counsel. This focus on outcomes is sensitive to
the reality of the plea marketplace, while safeguarding core
constitutional values.
Counsel: Where the Rubber Hits the Road in Capital Cases, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 122, 123
(2012) (suggesting that defendants require competent counsel to help the defendants appreciate
trial risks and plea offer benefits).
24. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1142.
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I. THE COURT’S PROCEDURAL APPROACH
Guilty pleas have been the dominant mode of guilt adjudication for a
century, but courts play a limited role in regulating them. Though the
Supreme Court views plea-bargaining as an “indispensible” feature of
the modern criminal justice system, it has regulated pleas with a light
touch by requiring courts to directly question defendants to ascertain
that they understand the plea terms and the rights they waive by
admitting guilt.25 By its terms, plea-bargaining connotes that the
defendant gets some “bargain” or concession on the charge or sentence
he is facing in exchange for pleading guilty.26 Pleading guilty is a
procedural choice (self-conviction in lieu of trial) that comes with
substantive consequences, most importantly, a conviction and
sentence.27 Regulating this process is a complex task in part because it
combines the distinct phases of adjudication—charging, guilt
adjudication, and sentencing. Although these phases may still exist as
formally separate proceedings, as a practical matter they may be
wrapped into the guilty plea terms that were privately negotiated,
outside the courtroom, with little judicial oversight. For example,
though courts routinely impose sentences at a separate hearing after the
guilty plea is accepted, the sentence imposed may have been set or
influenced by the terms of the guilty plea.28
The Court’s procedural approach to regulating pleas rests on three
constitutional components: prosecutorial discretion, due process, and
right to counsel. Because prosecutors control charging, the Court has
been reluctant on separation of powers grounds to regulate aggressive
charge bargaining and threats in the plea-negotiation phase that are the
carrot and stick used to induce guilty pleas.29 Instead, the Court has
primarily reviewed the validity of guilty pleas under the Due Process
Clause and required trial courts to complete a procedural checklist to
ensure that the defendant understands the trial rights he is waiving, as

25. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82–83 (2004); Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–43 (1969) (“[A] plea of guilty is more than an admission of
conduct; it is a conviction.”).
26. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (“Plea bargaining flows from ‘the
mutuality of advantage’ to defendants and prosecutors, each with his own reasons for wanting to
avoid trial.” (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970))); BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1270 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a “plea bargain” as an “agreement . . . whereby the
defendant pleads guilty . . . in exchange for some concession by the prosecutor, usu. a more
lenient sentence or a dismissal of the other charges”).
27. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242–43.
28. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (describing presentence report considerations, objections
to the presentence report, and sentencing hearing).
29. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (noting that prosecutorial
decisions are generally left to the broad discretion of prosecutors).
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well as the plea terms and its consequences.30 The Court has trusted that
because a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel, the
counsel will aid the defendant in protecting the defendant’s interests
during plea-bargaining.31
Together, these constitutional components reinforce a pleabargaining model that involves minimal judicial oversight. In this
model, prosecutors have broad discretion to charge and charge-bargain.
Courts assume that represented defendants can protect their own
interests in negotiations. And courts merely ensure that defendants
understand the terms and consequences of their guilty pleas. This
system relies on competent counsel, and the Court has long recognized
that incompetent counsel can invalidate a guilty plea.32 As a practical
matter, however, the guarantee of effective assistance during plea
negotiations has only indirectly impacted plea bargains because
ineffective assistance of counsel claims are relegated to post-conviction
proceedings33 and concerns about counsel are not part of the guilty plea
routine.
Lafler and Frye open the door for courts to consider concerns about
counsel before the plea is accepted and avoid prejudicial disparities
attributable to incompetent counsel. As this Article traces below, these
decisions erode the traditional divide between due process and right to
counsel analysis, rely on the substantive outcome of the case (the
conviction and sentence) to assess prejudice, and highlight that trial
courts are the locus of reforming guilty plea adjudication.
A. Regulating the Validity of a Guilty Plea
In regulating guilty pleas, the Supreme Court has developed minimal
due process safeguards and mostly deferred to counsel and the plea30. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243–44 (“What is at stake for an accused facing death or
imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the
matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and
of its consequence.”); see also Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644–45 & n.13 (1976)
(stating that a plea cannot be voluntary in the constitutional sense unless the defendant
understands both the nature of the constitutional rights he is waiving and the nature of the
charge against him).
31. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (stating that constitutional
consideration of the process of plea-bargaining presupposes fairness, secured in part by the right
to counsel).
32. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480–81 (2010); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
56 (1985); see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970) (upholding the validity of
a guilty plea as voluntarily and intelligently made when defendants were sufficiently advised by
competent counsel).
33. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are typically asserted in post-conviction
proceedings because the claim requires additional factual development, see Massaro v. United
States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003), or because state post-conviction rules preclude such claims on
direct appeal, see Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012).
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bargaining market as to the substance or outcome of the negotiations.34
The Court’s stated reasons for constitutionalized guilty plea procedures
reflect concerns about judicial oversight, transparency, unjust outcomes,
and finality. Overall, concerns about prosecutorial overreaching and the
coercive nature of plea-bargaining have taken a back seat to efficiency.
The Court has trusted that the plea-bargaining market and counsel will
ensure that pleas are proportional, accurate, and just.35
The Court’s seminal decision in Boykin v. Alabama36
constitutionalized the guilty plea procedure and highlighted important
concerns about the practice. The defendant in Boykin was charged with
five counts of robbery (a capital offense).37 With appointed counsel, he
pled guilty to all five counts just three days later, and was sentenced to
death.38 The Court acknowledged in Boykin that the “majority” of
convictions are obtained by guilty plea, but expressed concern about the
lack of judicial inquiry surrounding the defendant’s decision to plead
guilty to a death sentence so quickly.39 The “record [was] wholly
silent,” the Court said, on why a guilty plea was “the desirable
course.”40 Though defense counsel may have had valid reasons for
advising the defendant to plead guilty, the Court intoned, the lack of a
record, the speed at which the defendant entered the plea, and the
severity of the sentence were troubling.41 The Supreme Court faulted
the trial court for accepting a plea in a capital case with “no questions”
asked.42
Boykin fostered transparency, efficiency, and finality in the guilty
plea process. At its core, the Court affirmed judicial authority to review
the constitutionality of a guilty plea and injected the procedure with
constitutional norms, most notably a fully informed, on-the-record,
personal waiver of constitutional procedural rights. Because judicial
review requires a record, the Court required trial courts to make a record
by canvassing the defendant to establish that his guilty plea is knowing,

34. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1142 (describing the
role of judges in plea-bargaining as “passive and reactive”).
35. Id.
36. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
37. Id. at 239.
38. Id. at 239–40.
39. Id. at 244 n.7.
40. Id. at 240.
41. See id. at 239–40, 243–44.
42. Compare id. at 239 (“no questions”), with id. at 244 (quoting with approval the
Supreme Court of Alabama’s dissenting justices’ statement of the law “that there was reversible
error ‘because the record does not disclose that the defendant voluntarily and understandingly
entered his pleas of guilty’” (quoting Boykin v. State, 207 So. 2d 412, 415 (Ala. 1968)
(Goodwyn, J., dissenting))).
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intelligent, and voluntary.43 That meant that courts need to ascertain that
the defendant understands his procedural choice, the constitutional
rights he is waiving by pleading guilty and forgoing trial (the rights
against self-incrimination, to jury trial, and to confront accusers), as
well as the substantive impact, particularly the plea terms and
sentencing exposure.44
Providing for some judicial review legitimized and regularized
guilty pleas as well as cemented their finality. A judicially supervised,
recorded plea injected transparency into what the Court described as a
“previously clandestine practice.”45 The required judicial canvass of the
defendant about the guilty plea, though critiqued as “hasty and rote”
today, signified that the solemnity and finality of the proceeding
required this direct contact between the court and the defendant.46 The
Court made clear in Boykin that the need for finality was a driving
concern: having a contemporaneous record of the plea was intended to
“forestall[] the spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek to probe
murky memories.”47 Thus, the recorded guilty plea canvass would
provide courts a specific, constitutional role and prevent cases from
reappearing in post-conviction proceedings.
While Boykin established the Court’s procedural approach to
regulating pleas, concerns began to surface about the substance of those
bargains, separation of powers, and the role of trial court judges. As
mentioned, the Boykin Court was concerned as a matter of process and
outcome that the defendant pled guilty to crimes carrying the death
penalty just three days after being charged, with “no questions” asked
by the judge.48 The Court observed that criminal convictions demand
more of courts, specifically, that “an accused facing death or
imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are
capable in canvassing the matter with the accused.”49
Despite voicing these concerns, in subsequent decisions the Court
seemed content to leave the substance of plea bargains to the parties and
43. Id. at 243–44.
44. See id. at 243 & n.5. The Court further required in Henderson v. Morgan that the
defendant understand the essential elements of the offense, the nature of the charges as they
relate to the facts, and admit facts sufficient to support the conviction. 426 U.S. 637, 645–47
(1976) (invalidating second-degree murder conviction where defendant was not informed about
an intent to kill, an essential element of the offense).
45. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978) (citing Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 758 (1970)).
46. Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 733 (2010) (“Guilty pleas,
although indispensible to the smooth processing of criminal justice, have become hasty and
rote . . . .”); see Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243–44.
47. 395 U.S. at 244 & n.7 (advising that a detailed plea canvass is necessary “[i]f these
convictions are to be insulated from attack”).
48. Id. at 239.
49. Id. at 243–44.
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ratified the use of hardball tactics by prosecutors to induce a guilty
plea.50 The Court has assumed that prosecutors and defense counsel
“possess relatively equal bargaining power,” and that plea-bargaining
benefits both sides.51 Defendants plead guilty, commonly, to avoid a
harsher sentence or more serious charges.52 The state benefits from a
quick and final conviction, which allows it to conserve scarce
prosecutorial and judicial resources.53 It is this “mutuality of advantage”
to both sides—certainty and convenience for the prosecutor and the
prospect of a better outcome for the defendant—that explains why most
defendants plead guilty.54 In Brady, the Court rejected the defendant’s
claim that his plea was involuntary because it was entered to avoid the
death penalty.55 Only actual or threatened physical harm or overbearing
mental coercion, the Court stated, would render the plea involuntary.56
Pleading guilty to avoid the threat of an increased penalty, even death,
was deemed a legitimate and noncoercive reason to forgo trial and did
not render the plea invalid.57
The Court approved the prosecutor’s use of aggressive chargebargaining tactics to induce a guilty plea.58 Bordenkircher v. Hayes
presented the thorny question of whether a prosecutor violated due
process by threatening to bring more serious charges if the defendant
rejected a plea offer.59 Prosecutors enjoy virtually unfettered discretion
in charging, so long as the charges are not discriminatory and are
supported by probable cause.60 In Bordenkircher, the defendant, a two50. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364 (“[T]his Court has necessarily accepted as
constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the prosecutor’s interest at the bargaining table
is to persuade the defendant to forgo his right to plead not guilty.”); Brady, 397 U.S. at 750
(holding that the defendant’s fear of the death penalty did not rise to the level that would
invalidate his guilty plea).
51. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 6, at 8–9 (citing Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 362;
Brady, 397 U.S. at 752–53).
52. Brady, 397 U.S. at 749–50 (observing that many defendants plead guilty to get a more
lenient sentence, to get reduced or dismissed charges, to gain certainty, and avoid the “agony
and expense” of trial).
53. See id. at 752 (prosecutorial resources).
54. Id. at 752 & n.10 (citing DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF
GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 3 & n.1 (1966) (noting that, at that time, guilty pleas
accounted for the vast majority of convictions, some 90–95% of all convictions and 70–85% of
felony convictions)).
55. Id. at 758.
56. Id. at 748.
57. Id. at 750 (narrowly defining coercion, i.e., if the state used “actual or threatened
physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant”).
58. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358–59, 365 (1978) (allowing the threat of
life imprisonment as “a legitimate use of available leverage in the plea-bargaining process”).
59. Id. at 358.
60. Id. at 364 (“[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused
committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what
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time felon, was charged with check forgery, which carried a statutory
range of two to ten years.61 The prosecutor offered to recommend a
five-year prison term if the defendant pled guilty as charged.62 If not,
the prosecutor threatened to indict him under Kentucky’s habitual
offender statute, which carried a mandatory life term.63 The defendant
rejected the offer, was indicted on the habitual charge, convicted by a
jury, and sentenced to life in prison.64 The Court held that the
prosecutor did not violate due process by threatening (and then
charging) the defendant with a mandatory life sentence offense for
refusing to accept a plea offer.65
Bordenkircher highlights how charge-bargaining collapses three
formally distinct adjudication phases: charging, guilt adjudication, and
sentencing. In trial adjudication, these discrete tasks are performed by
different institutional actors—prosecutors charge (with minimal judicial
or grand jury oversight), juries or judges convict, and judges impose the
sentence. These separate institutional roles operate as a check (by the
court or a jury) on the executive powers to charge, convict, and
imprison.66 In the plea context, the prosecutor may effectively control
all three functions—charging, adjudication, and sentencing—displacing
the role of judge and jury.67 Bordenkircher also shows the draconian
sentencing consequences—the trial penalty—a defendant may suffer by
proceeding to trial.68 The Court sanctioned such charging tactics.69
charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”), quoted
with approval in United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); Inmates of Attica Corr.
Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379 (2d Cir. 1973) (dismissing a complaint seeking
mandamus relief to compel prosecution despite allegations which raised “serious
questions . . . as to the protection of the civil rights and physical security of a definable class of
victims of crime and as to the fair administration of the criminal justice system”); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law . . . .”).
61. 434 U.S. at 358.
62. Id. at 358–59.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 359.
65. Id. at 365.
66. See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV.
989, 996–97 (2006).
67. Id. at 997, 1017.
68. Cf. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow,
117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2561 (2004) (noting that state judges, who are elected by the same
voters as prosecutors, have an incentive to impose penalties on defendants who wish to go to
trial); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 84–86 (2005) (arguing that federal prosecutors have become increasingly
able to threaten large penalties for going to trial and to promise large rewards for pleading
guilty).
69. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 358–59, 365 (holding that the prosecutor did not violate
due process by carrying out his threat to seek a mandatory life term against a defendant who
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The Court’s deference in Bordenkircher to prosecutorial charging
decisions and market forces is justified, nominally, on its particular
framing of separation of powers.70 Because the prosecutor decides what
charges to bring and when to bring them, the Court reasoned, it made no
difference whether the prosecutor obtained an indictment on the
habitual offender charge at the outset or later, as a lever in pleabargaining.71 Discouraging the defendant from exercising his right to
trial was an “inevitable,” “permissible,” and “constitutionally
legitimate” attribute of a system that tolerates and encourages guilty
pleas.72 Bordenkircher ensured that guilty pleas would be prosecutor
controlled, with minimal judicial oversight.73
The dissenters in Bordenkircher voiced concern about the lack of
transparency and coercive effect of unchecked charge-bargaining.74 The
Court of Appeals held that a prosecutor could bargain down from the
original charge but could not penalize a defendant for exercising his
right to trial, as the defendant had done.75 Justice Harold Blackmun, in
his dissenting opinion, recognized that such a rule (rejected by the
majority) would lead prosecutors to stack higher charges at the outset,
leaving defendants in the worse position of trying to secure release and
bargain for lower charges.76 But fixing charges at the outset would
create transparency and interpose regular checks on prosecutors’
charging decisions. This was a preferable rule, he argued, for three
reasons: (1) the charging decision would be made independent of
knowing the defendant’s willingness to plead and not used as a pleabargaining hammer; (2) it would “keep charging practices visible to the
general public” by requiring the prosecutor to “lay his cards on the table
with an indictment of public record at the beginning of the bargaining
process”; and (3) it would eliminate concerns about whether the grand

rejected a plea offer).
70. Id. at 364–65 (noting that the charging decision rests entirely in the prosecutor’s
discretion, though “there are undoubtedly constitutional limits upon its exercise”).
71. Id. at 360–61 (“As a practical matter, in short, this case would be no different if the
grand jury had indicted Hayes as a recidivist from the outset, and the prosecutor had offered to
drop that charge as part of the plea bargain.”).
72. Id. at 364. The Court distinguished this trial penalty from a line of earlier cases in
which the prosecutor penalized a defendant with new, more serious charges for successfully
appealing his conviction. Id. at 362–63 (distinguishing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27–28
(1974); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969), overruled on other grounds by
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989)).
73. William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the
Rule of Law, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 351, 375–76 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006).
74. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 368 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
75. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 44–45 (6th Cir. 1976), rev’d sub nom. Bordenkircher,
434 U.S. 357.
76. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 368 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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jury would actually indict for the greater charges.77 Justice Blackmun
also argued that after the defendant was indicted on the higher charge,
he should have been given a final chance to accept the plea bargain.78
Added transparency and accountability would at least make the choice
of pleading guilty more clear to the defendant, the public, and the court.
While embracing a prosecutor-controlled market approach, the
Bordenkircher Court sidelined concerns about prosecutorial
overreaching and substantive fairness. Justice Lewis F. Powell, also
writing in dissent, argued that the “result” was unjust and the
prosecutor’s tactics violated due process.”79 The prosecutor’s actions
violated due process, Justice Powell wrote, because “their admitted
purpose was to discourage and then to penalize with unique severity
[the defendant’s] exercise of constitutional rights.”80 The majority
Court, however, dismissed these concerns and ruled that the lower court
was “mistaken” in holding that the “substance of the plea offer itself
violated” due process.81
In contrast to the values expressed in Boykin, in Brady and
Bordenkircher the Court sanctioned prosecutors’ reliance on aggressive
charge bargaining to induce a guilty plea. Boykin’s procedural approach
was based on core constitutional values: transparency, judicial review,
and substantive fairness. Brady and Bordenkircher appeared to undercut
those values. The Court welcomed aggressive plea-bargaining tactics
without regard to how they might distort the defendant’s conviction and
sentence. The role of competent defense counsel was important to the
Court’s embrace of this guilty plea system, but the Court’s efforts to
guarantee that right were limited.
B. Regulating Defense Counsel in the Plea Phase
Another essential component of the Court’s historic procedural
approach to plea bargaining was its assumption that defense counsel
would protect the defendant’s interests in plea bargaining.82 On this
assumption, the Court allowed plea-bargaining to be a party-driven and
private process without court oversight. In Hill v. Lockhart83 the Court
recognized a defendant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel

77. Id. at 368 n.2.
78. Id. at 369 n.2.
79. Id.at 368–69 (Powell, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 373.
81. Id. at 362 (majority opinion) (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 n.8
(1970)).
82. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 646–47 (1976); see also Bordenkircher, 434
U.S. at 362; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770–71 (1970); Brady, 397 U.S. at 749.
83. 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
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during plea-bargaining.84 Specifically, Hill permitted defendants
convicted by guilty plea to challenge their convictions by claiming they
were denied the right to effective assistance of counsel pursuant to
Strickland v. Washington, which governs a challenge to a conviction
based on ineffective assistance of counsel.85 It was significant that Hill
recognized an important constitutional basis to challenge a guilty plea
conviction under the Sixth Amendment based on incompetent counsel.
But Hill’s reach was limited in part because it framed the inquiry so
narrowly. Today, Strickland continues to provide the governing
standard, but the Court’s recent decisions in Lafler and Frye apply
Strickland more flexibly.
Hill opened the door to new challenges to guilty plea convictions
and increased judicial oversight of plea-bargaining. In Hill the
defendant complained that his plea was invalid because his lawyer
misinformed him about the sentencing consequences of pleading
guilty.86 The defendant, who was facing a possible life sentence, pled
guilty in exchange for the prosecutor’s agreement to recommend a term
of thirty-five years, which the court later imposed.87 The court and
defense counsel informed the defendant that he would need to complete
at least one-third of his sentence to become eligible for parole.88 Due to
a prior felony conviction, however, the defendant later learned that he
would need to serve one-half of his sentence before he was parole
eligible.89 Though the Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s claim,90
it established that Strickland applies to challenges to guilty pleas based
on ineffective assistance of counsel.91
Hill greatly expanded the Court’s review of guilty pleas and its
exposure to plea-bargaining realities. To prevail under the Strickland
standard, the defendant in Hill was required to prove that “but for [his]
counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial.”92 To evaluate the Strickland claim, the Court needed
to probe off-the-record, behind-the-scenes activities and conversations
that led counsel to recommend the plea, or fail to develop alternatives.93
84. Id. at 56–57 (“[A] defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel ‘may only
attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he
received from counsel was not within the standards set forth in McMann.’” (quoting Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973))).
85. 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984).
86. Hill, 474 U.S. at 53.
87. Id. at 54.
88. Id. at 54–55.
89. Id. at 55.
90. Id. at 60.
91. Id. at 57–59.
92. Id. at 59.
93. Id. (noting that the inquiry may include whether counsel failed to investigate or
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Such evidence might include the history of plea offers, the strength of
the evidence against the defendant, his possible defenses, risks
associated with trial, and counsel’s investigation, communication, and
advice.94 The Boykin inquiry focuses primarily on the trial court record,
especially the plea canvass and sentencing hearing.95 So, while courts
generally left plea negotiations to the parties without judicial oversight,
Hill provided courts a window into this phase of the case.
For practical and doctrinal reasons, however, Hill’s impact was
limited and understanding those limitations is important to appreciating
the impact of Lafler and Frye. Three key features limited Hill’s scope.
First, Hill tethered the ineffective assistance claim to due process
analysis. Second, it hinged the prejudice analysis on a procedural choice
(pleading guilty versus proceeding to trial). Third, like trial-based
Strickland claims, it relegated complaints about deficient counsel to
post-conviction proceedings with the remedy of a new trial. As I discuss
below, Lafler and Frye alter each of these features and provide a
broader, more flexible approach to redressing ineffective assistance of
counsel during plea negotiations.
The first limitation is that Hill expressly linked the validity of the
plea (a due process concern96) to counsel’s performance (a Sixth
Amendment concern97). Before Hill, the Court repeatedly
acknowledged the critical role of defense counsel in plea-bargaining and
suggested that defense counsel’s erroneous advice during the plea phase
might be grounds to attack the voluntariness, and thus, the validity, of a
plea.98 The Court connected these dots in Hill and relied on Strickland
discover potentially exculpatory evidence or failed to advise the defendant of available
affirmative defenses).
94. Id.; see, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360–61 (1978) (evaluating the
defendant’s trial risks); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 744–45, 749–50, 756 (1970)
(evaluating counsel’s communication with the defendant and the defendant’s trial risks).
95. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 240 (1969) (noting that “the record [was] wholly
silent” on defense counsel’s “[t]rial strategy”); id. at 243–44 (noting that the “stake for a[]
[defendant] facing death or imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are
capable in canvassing the [plea] with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of
what the plea connotes and of its consequences”); id. at 244 (“When the judge discharges th[e]
[plea canvassing] function, he leaves a record adequate for any review that may later be
sought.”); Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 362 (noting that “[t]he open acknowledgement” of plea
negotiations “has led th[e] Court to recognize . . . the need for a public record indicating a plea
was knowingly and voluntarily made”); Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 642–43 (1976)
(focusing on the defendant’s “direct colloquy with the trial judge” at the plea hearing and
statements at sentencing); id. at 639–40 (considering the evidentiary hearing testimony of the
defendant, the defense attorneys, the prosecutor, and others).
96. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
97. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (recognizing a standard for
“reasonably effective assistance” based on the Sixth Amendment).
98. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (1978) (“Defendants advised by competent
counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of intelligent
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to provide the Sixth Amendment analysis. In Hill the Court established
that ineffective assistance of counsel could undermine the validity of the
guilty plea because the “voluntariness of the plea depends on whether
counsel’s advice” was reasonable.99 Thus, the Court’s inquiry in Hill (as
in Boykin) tests the validity of the guilty plea (a due process issue) with
an expanded scope.
A second limitation on Hill’s reach is that it hinges Strickland
analysis on a procedural choice: whether to plead guilty or go to trial.
Strickland framed its prejudice test broadly: whether, but for counsel’s
deficient performance, “there is a reasonable probability that . . . the
result of the proceeding would have been different.”100 This test
contemplates a different substantive outcome. Hill narrowed the
question to a procedural one: The defendant needed to show that “but
for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial.”101 This binary, procedural choice approach—
plead guilty or go to trial—departed from Strickland’s substantive
assessment of prejudice. Proving that a defendant would have insisted
on going to trial is difficult and risky. It is difficult to prove because
many defendants are deciding among plea offers, but not contemplating
trial, which requires a viable defense and risks harsher penalties.102 And
success itself is risky because the standard remedy for a Hill claim is to
withdraw the plea and restore the defendant to his pre-plea status—that
is, facing trial.103
Third, aside from its limited doctrinal scope, practical aspects of Hill
rendered the right of effective assistance of counsel in plea-bargaining
choice in response to prosecutorial persuasion [in plea-bargaining], and unlikely to be driven to
false self-condemnation.” (emphasis added)); Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976)
(holding that the defendant’s plea was involuntary where “the trial judge found . . . that the
element of intent was not explained to respondent,” but suggesting that defense counsel’s failure
to “explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the [defendant] notice of what he
is being asked to admit” might be grounds to attack the voluntariness of the plea); McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770–72 (1970) (discussing the intelligence and voluntariness of
guilty pleas in relationship to the competency of counsel’s advice); Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 749 (1970) (affirming the lower court’s “finding of voluntariness” where defendant,
“advised by competent counsel,” decided to plead guilty).
99. 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (citing McMann, 397 U.S. at 771).
100. Id. at 57 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
101. Id. at 59.
102. Cf. id. at 60 (holding that “the District Court did not err in declining to hold a hearing
on petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim” because “petitioner’s allegations [were]
insufficient to satisfy the Strickland v. Washington requirement of ‘prejudice’”).
103. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (holding that “[t]he nature of relief
secured by a successful collateral challenge to a guilty plea [is] an opportunity to withdraw the
plea and proceed to trial”); see also Margaret Love & Gabriel J. Chin, The “Major Upheaval”
of Padilla v. Kentucky: Extending the Right to Counsel to the Collateral Consequences of
Conviction, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2010, at 36, 39–40.
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an underenforced guarantee. Typically, defendants can only make a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during post-conviction
proceedings,104 which often take years.105 This means that only
defendants with longer sentences have the time to pursue Hill claims to
completion.106 In the pursuit of such claims, there is no right to
counsel,107 and showing deficient performance and prejudice often
requires developing facts outside the record and an evidentiary
hearing.108 Further, procedural rules and deferential review standards
pose significant barriers to relief.109 The record and client file in a guilty
plea case are usually far less developed than in cases that went to trial,
and the judge handling the ineffective assistance of counsel claim may
be less familiar with the defendant since there was no trial.110 Thus,
postponing Sixth Amendment scrutiny until the post-conviction phase
means that many defendants simply cannot bring or win such claims.
Importantly, Hill did not alter plea-bargaining or guilty plea
104. Louis D. Bilionis & Richard A. Rosen, Lawyers, Arbitrariness, and the Eighth
Amendment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1997).
105. The time needed to litigate a federal habeas action, six to seven years, far exceeds the
median sentence of about seventeen months and the average sentence length of about three years
and two months. NANCY J. KING ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, FINAL TECHNICAL
REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 55, 56 & tbl. 13 (2007), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf (finding that, on average, it takes all
federal habeas noncapital petitioners over six years to file a petition in federal court and 11.5
months for the court’s decision); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbl. 5.48.2006, http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/pdf/t5482006.pdf (finding that the mean and median incarceration sentence lengths
for all felony offenses in state courts in 2006 is, respectively, thirty-eight months and seventeen
months).
106. See KING ET AL., supra note 105, at 20 (finding that, for noncapital cases, 27.7% of
habeas petitioners had a life sentence, while the remainder had an average sentence of twenty
years).
107. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“We have never held that prisoners
have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their
convictions . . . .” (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488 (1969))).
108. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012) (discussing the defendant’s postconviction “testi[mony that] he would have entered a guilty plea to [a] misdemeanor had he
known about the offer”); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1389 (2012) (noting that a court
may hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant has shown prejudice).
109. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785–86
(2011) (discussing deference to state courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)); see also Anne R.
Traum, Last Best Chance for the Great Writ: Equitable Tolling and Federal Habeas Corpus, 68
MD. L. REV. 545, 547 n.7, 558, 585 n.215 (2009) (describing procedural default, exhaustion, and
timing rules in federal habeas review).
110. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 6, at 10 (observing that trial court judges are
unfamiliar with the facts of a guilty plea case because there has been no trial). Such off-therecord evidence must be developed at an evidentiary hearing, which in federal habeas review is
rare. See KING ET AL., supra note 105, at 35–36 (noting that, in U.S. District Courts, evidentiary
hearings were held in 0.4% of noncapital habeas corpus cases, and around 10% of capital cases).
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procedures. Hill created a new basis to challenge a guilty plea, and
exposed judges to the ingredients, including deficient counsel, that
influence plea-bargaining. As a practical matter, Hill did little to alter
the status quo for the majority of defendants who plead guilty.
C. Frye and Lafler: Incorporating Outcomes Analysis
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Frye and Lafler bring
ineffective assistance of counsel claims into the modern era by shifting
the focus toward plea-bargaining and outcomes. The Court’s analysis in
Hill focused on the validity of the plea and the defendant’s procedural
choice of whether to plead guilty or go to trial. Though Strickland
prejudice analysis tests whether the result of the proceeding would have
been different, in Hill that analysis seemed to turn more on the
adjudication process than the sentence. Frye and Lafler take a different
tract, reflecting that process choices and sentencing outcomes are
integrally related. These cases establish that a Sixth Amendment
ineffective assistance of counsel claim does not turn on whether the
conviction is invalid or the defendant’s procedural choice to plead
guilty or go to trial. Instead, the Court in Lafler and Frye focused on
whether counsel’s incompetence affected the outcome—the substantive
result.111 The Court also considered practical concerns about remedies
and reform, suggesting that trial courts have a greater role to play than it
previously acknowledged.112
In Lafler and Frye, the Court established three key doctrinal points:
(1) a Strickland claim is independent of other constitutional claims and
may succeed even though the conviction is valid; (2) the focus of
Strickland prejudice is whether counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced the outcome, i.e., the defendant’s conviction and sentence,
not just his procedural choice of whether to plead guilty or go to trial;
and (3) to remedy a Strickland violation, a court may order a prosecutor
to reoffer an earlier plea offer. A fourth point pertains to prophylactic
reform, namely, the Court’s suggestion that trial-level reforms to the
plea procedure could avoid or ameliorate ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.113
This section discusses these doctrinal points and observes how the
Court’s Sixth Amendment analysis and focus on outcomes are relevant
to the broader task of reframing plea adjudication.

111. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384, 1386–88; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410.
112. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1390; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410.
113. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1390 (arguing that the “prosecution and the trial courts may adopt
some measures to help ensure against late, frivolous, or fabricated claims after a later, less
advantageous plea offer has been accepted or after a trial leading to conviction” (quoting Frye,
132 S. Ct. at 1408–09) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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1. Delinking Strickland and Due Process
a. Claiming Strickland, Not Hill
The defendants’ claims in Lafler and Frye were patterned not on
Hill, but on Strickland, which the Court applied generally to claims of
deficient counsel before trial. Hill permitted a defendant to claim his
plea invalid because, absent attorney error, he would have gone to
trial.114 Neither Lafler nor Frye fit that mold because neither of the
defendants in these cases claimed his conviction was invalid and neither
sought trial as a remedy. Instead, each of the defendants in Lafler and
Frye complained that he fared worse, in terms of his conviction and
sentence, due to his defense counsel’s deficient advice during the plea
stage.
Lafler and Frye presented an opportunity to confront Hill’s limited
scope, which the Supreme Court had no occasion to do in Padilla v.
Kentucky,115 its 2010 landmark decision. In Padilla, a noncitizen pled
guilty in state court to a felony drug charge that would result in
mandatory deportation.116 His lawyer erroneously told him before
pleading guilty “that he did not have to worry about immigration
[consequences].”117 The defendant in Padilla alleged under Hill that, but
for his attorney’s incorrect advice, he would have not pled guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.118 The Court agreed that defense
counsel’s performance was deficient, and remanded on prejudice under
Hill.119 The Court’s opinion implied more broadly, however, that Hill
was not a perfect fit for most defendants since immigration
consequences are relevant to negotiating a better plea.120 Effective
defense counsel would negotiate to avoid or reduce the risk of
deportation, which in turn would create a powerful inducement to plead
guilty.121 Though Padilla mentioned these plea-bargaining dynamics, it
stuck to a traditional Hill framework.

114. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S 52, 58–59 (1985).
115. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
116. Id. at 1477–78 (referring to a guilty plea for “transportation of a large amount of
marijuana”).
117. Id. at 1478 (quoting Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008),
rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1473) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. See id. See generally id. at 1485 n.12 (discussing the relationship between Strickland
and Hill in reference to Padilla).
119. See id. at 1486–87.
120. See id. at 1486 (“By bringing deportation consequences into this [criminal] process,
the defense and prosecution may well be able to reach agreements that better satisfy the interests
of both parties.”).
121. Id.
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Lafler and Frye, by contrast, required the Court to consider how
Strickland would apply to claims that did not fit the Hill mold.122 In
Frye, defense counsel failed to communicate a favorable plea offer to
the defendant (Frye), who later entered a less favorable plea without an
agreement.123 Frye was charged with driving with a revoked license,
pled guilty to the felony charge, and received a three-year sentence.124
Unknown to Frye, the prosecutor had sent a letter to his counsel
containing two plea options, one of which would have reduced the
charge to a misdemeanor with a recommendation of a ninety-day jail
sentence.125 Frye’s counsel did not tell him about the offers, which
expired before he pled guilty without a plea agreement.126 Frye later
claimed that he would have accepted the offer to plead to a
misdemeanor had he known about it.127
In Lafler, the defendant (Cooper) claimed that he would have
accepted a plea instead of going to trial, which led to a much harsher
sentence.128 Cooper’s charges, including assault with intent to murder,
arose from a shooting.129 Before trial, Cooper rejected two plea offers,
including one for a recommended sentence of fifty-one to eighty-five
months, based on his counsel’s erroneous advice that the prosecutor
could not prove at trial he had the requisite intent to kill.130 The jury
convicted the defendant on all counts and he was sentenced to a
mandatory term of 185 to 360 months.131 All parties agreed that
Cooper’s counsel gave him bad advice, so the issue was whether
Cooper could establish Strickland prejudice despite the valid jury
verdict.132
The Court analyzed both claims under Strickland, which required the
Court to determine if “the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different with competent advice.”133 Lafler presented the opposite fact
situation from Hill, the Court reasoned, because Cooper alleged that the
ineffective assistance “led not to an offer’s acceptance but to its

122. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384–85 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399,
1405–06 (2012).
123. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404.
124. Id. at 1404–05.
125. Id. at 1404.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1405.
128. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1386–87 (2012).
129. Id. at 1383.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1384.
133. Id. (citing Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1410 (2012)) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
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rejection.”134 And in Frye, “[t]he challenge [was] not to the advice
pertaining to the plea that was accepted but rather to the course of legal
representation that preceded it with respect to other potential pleas and
plea offers.”135
The Court’s broad restatement of Strickland clarified that it governs
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea-bargaining stage,
regardless of whether the defendant is ultimately convicted by guilty
plea or at trial. Strickland provides the constitutional standard for all
ineffective assistance of counsel claims (of which Hill is just one
application) and, though a rigorous standard, it is sufficiently flexible to
encompass many manifestations of deficient performance, like those
presented in Lafler and Frye. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims
can now take at least three forms, provided the Strickland test is
satisfied: (1) the defendant pled guilty but wanted a trial (Hill), (2) the
defendant pled guilty but wanted a different plea (Frye), and (3) the
defendant was convicted at trial but wanted to plead guilty (Lafler).
b. Strickland as an Independent Basis for Relief
Lafler and Frye also recognize that Strickland provides an
independent basis on which to challenge a guilty plea under the Sixth
Amendment. These cases provide that denial of the Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel is grounds to challenge a
conviction, even if the conviction resulted from a reliable guilty plea or
fair trial. Professor Justin F. Marceau hails Lafler and Frye as
commencing “a new era in the jurisprudence of the Sixth
Amendment.”136 He argues that Lafler and Frye recognize that
Strickland does not merely provide a remedy for incompetent lawyering
at the trial and sentencing stages, but permits claims addressing
prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel during the pre-trial phase,
including plea-bargaining.137 The significance for guilty pleas is
twofold. First, Frye places Sixth Amendment analysis of guilty pleas on
the same plane as due process analysis under Boykin. Second, Lafler
emphasizes that in today’s world, plea-bargaining is as critical as trial or
sentencing in determining the outcome of the case.
Frye establishes that a guilty plea can be set aside based purely on
Sixth Amendment grounds. Before Frye, Strickland played the role of
helper doctrine in assessing the validity of a guilty plea.138 Frye severs
that link. In Hill and Padilla, the defendants claimed that defense
counsel’s incompetent advice led them to plead guilty without full
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 1385.
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1406.
Marceau, supra note 4, at 1161.
Id. at 1162–63.
See supra Section I.B.
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knowledge of the consequences.139 In Hill, the Court adopted the theory
that “the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s
advice” was reasonable.140 In other words, the Sixth Amendment
(Strickland) violation, if proven, resulted in a due process violation (an
invalid plea).141 In Frye, there was no due process claim since Frye did
not challenge the validity of the accepted guilty plea, but instead
challenged the ineffective assistance of counsel that preceded it.142 In
Frye, the Sixth Amendment analysis stands on its own, not as an
adjunct to due process analysis.143
Frye puts the Sixth Amendment on equal footing with due process as
a basis for challenging guilty pleas, but, unlike Boykin, it fails to dictate
new procedural safeguards.144 After Frye, courts must assure that guilty
pleas satisfy both due process and Sixth Amendment concerns since
either might provide a basis to set aside a guilty plea. The Court in
Boykin intended the plea canvass to satisfy due process concerns and
preclude collateral challenges.145 Courts have a constitutionalized script,
based on Boykin, to assess whether a guilty plea satisfies due process.146
But, as in Frye, the same conviction might be vulnerable to collateral
attack under Strickland if the defendant experienced prejudicial
ineffective assistance of counsel before the guilty plea. The current plea
canvass requirement is not designed to probe Sixth Amendment
concerns, like whether counsel provided effective assistance. As
discussed below, the Court suggested that trial courts might develop
safeguards to cure some errors, such as the failure to communicate an
offer.147 For now, Frye does not constitutionalize such reforms in the
way that Boykin did.
Lafler reinforces that the Strickland analysis is independent from the
validity of the conviction. In Lafler, the defendant (Cooper) was

139. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 53
(1985).
140. Hill, 474 U.S. at 56 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
141. See id. at 60 (rejecting the defendant’s claim because he failed to allege that
ineffective assistance of counsel caused him to choose the guilty plea over trial).
142. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404, 1409–10 (2012).
143. See id.
144. See supra Section I.A.
145. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243–44 & n.7 (1969).
146. TROY K. STABENOW, WEST’S FEDERAL FORMS: DISTRICT COURTS—CRIMINAL § 84:45
(2012) (providing a script for a plea before a magistrate judge). But see United States v. Ward,
518 F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2008) (“While we recognize that no particular form or script is required
and that state courts have considerable leeway to establish a record in whatever reasonable
manner they see fit, Boykin established that the record of a guilty plea must affirmatively
disclose that the defendant made his plea intelligently and voluntarily.” (quoting Hanson v.
Phillips, 442 F.3d 789, 800 (2d Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
147. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408–09.
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convicted at trial and did not challenge the validity of the verdict.148 The
state and the Solicitor General argued that since “the sole purpose of the
Sixth Amendment [was] to protect the right to a fair trial,” which
Cooper received, “[e]rrors before trial . . . are not cognizable . . . unless
they affect the fairness of the trial itself.”149 The Court rejected as too
narrow the notion that a valid verdict “wipes clean any deficient
performance by defense counsel during plea bargaining.”150 The Court
stated that while a defendant may not be entitled to a plea bargain, he is
entitled to effective assistance of counsel in considering any plea
bargain offered by the prosecutor.151 The Sixth Amendment protects
that right and defense counsel’s incompetent advice interfered with that
right: “[H]ere the question is not the fairness or reliability of the trial but
the fairness and regularity of the processes that preceded it . . . .”152 As
Professor Marceau argues, Lafler established the right to effective
assistance of counsel “as valuable for its own sake, and not merely as an
adjunct to the fair trial right.”153
Lafler and Frye establish that the Sixth Amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel provides an independent source of
authority to challenge a conviction, whether by guilty plea or trial,
where incompetent counsel’s advice during plea-bargaining prejudiced
the outcome.
2. Measuring Prejudice Based on Outcomes
The Court in Lafler and Frye has accorded substantive outcomes a
new, constitutional relevance in two significant ways. Substantive
outcomes refers here to the charges of conviction and the sentence
imposed as a result of the guilty plea or trial verdict. First, for purposes
of analyzing Strickland, substantive outcomes provide a concrete,
workable measure of prejudice. Second, outcomes analysis reflects that
plea-bargaining is about negotiating the sentence. The Court’s
application of outcome-based prejudice analysis reinforces that pleas,
not trials, are the norm and that prior plea offers within the case and the
local going (market) rate for pleas in the jurisdiction provide relevant
yardsticks for assessing prejudice.
The Court’s prejudice analysis in Lafler and Frye focused on the
substantive outcome of the cases.154 This focus is faithful to Strickland’s
148. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (2012).
149. Id. at 1385.
150. Id. at 1388.
151. Id. at 1384, 1387.
152. Id. at 1388.
153. Marceau, supra note 4, at 1216.
154. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1411 (2012) (remanding for a determination of
whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the trial court would have accepted the earlier
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prejudice test, which turns on a different result. In Hill, prejudice turned
on a procedural-choice: whether, with competent counsel, the defendant
would have opted for trial instead of pleading guilty.155 Though this was
the correct yardstick for assessing prejudice in Hill, the Court explained,
it is not the “sole means for demonstrating prejudice arising from the
deficient performance of counsel during plea negotiations.”156 The
prejudice claimed in Lafler and Frye was the defendant’s missed
opportunity to accept a favorable plea outcome.157 The Court considered
what difference counsel’s incompetenc made in the outcome of the case.
Prejudice can be shown, the Court stated in Lafler, “if loss of the
plea opportunity led to a trial resulting in a conviction on more serious
charges or the imposition of a more severe sentence.”158 In Frye,
procedural factors influencing the plea also played a role.159 In Frye, the
favorable plea offer lapsed due to counsel’s deficient performance and
Frye was arrested (again and for the same offense) before he pled
guilty.160 So, there was a risk that the prosecutor would have withdrawn
the original offer or that the court would not have accepted it.161 To
prevail on his Strickland claim, Frye needed to prove “a reasonable
probability that the end result of the criminal process would have been
more favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of
less prison time.”162
The outcome orientation of Lafler and Frye reflects that the
sentence, not guilt, drives plea-bargaining. By focusing on outcomes,
these cases adjust doctrine based on the fact that ours is “for the most
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”163 So, while the verdict
may properly be the focus of prejudice analysis in trial cases, most
defendants plead guilty, and deficient counsel impacts their sentence,
that is, the amount of jail or prison time they receive.164 Sentencing
differences are easy to identify and offer a concrete measure of whether
the defendant was worse off due to incompetent counsel. The
sentencing consequences stemming from a different conviction may be
plea offer); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694
(1984)).
155. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
156. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409–10.
157. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384–85; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409.
158. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387.
159. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409–11.
160. Id. at 1404.
161. Id. at 1411.
162. Id. at 1409.
163. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388.
164. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J.
1909, 1912 (1992) (“To a large extent, this kind of horse trading determines who goes to jail and
for how long.”), quoted in Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
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obvious in some cases, such as where the defendant could have pled to
an offense that is a misdemeanor, has a lower sentencing range (or
statutory cap), is probationary, or would yield different immigration
consequences. In the wake of Lafler and Frye, defendants may have
difficulty proving their counsel was deficient, but the requirement for
prejudice—proving a reasonable probability of a lesser offense or less
severe sentence—is at least clear.165
With outcomes in mind, the Court revisited the harsh trial penalty
using a Strickland lens. The trial penalty reflects a two-tiered system in
which defendants get the “going rate” by pleading guilty or risk a more
severe sentence by going to trial.166 The Bordenkircher Court approved
the use of aggressive charge-bargaining to induce guilty pleas (the
carrot) and facilitate the trial penalty (the stick).167 In Lafler and Frye,
the Court instead showed a preference for sentences that are in line with
the prevailing punishment for similar conduct. Severe sentencing laws,
the Court acknowledged, “exist on the books largely for bargaining
purposes,” and may exceed what Congress or the prosecutor deems
appropriate for the crime.168 Since 94%–97% of defendants plead guilty,
the negotiated plea sentence is what the defendant would have received
in the “ordinary course,” absent deficient counsel.169 In Lafler and Frye,
the history of plea offers in each of these cases supplied this
information.170 For example, in Lafler the defendant claimed that absent
counsel’s errors, “he would have accepted a plea offer for a sentence the
prosecution evidently deemed consistent with the sound administration
of criminal justice” instead of the harsher sentence—“3½ times more
165. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Proving Prejudice for Ineffective Assistance Claims After
Frye, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 147, 147 (2012) (suggesting that Frye increased the prejudice the
defendant must prove to get relief).
166. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2528 (2004) (“Experienced counsel and repeat players reduce uncertainty by
developing going rates and bonds of trust.”).
167. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978); see also supra notes 58–81
and accompanying text.
168. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Barkow, supra note 66, at 1034) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Bibas, supra note 20, at 154–55 (discussing the majority’s reasoning in
Frye and Lafler).
169. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387 (“The favorable sentence that
eluded the defendant in the criminal proceeding appears to be the sentence he or others in his
position would have received in the ordinary course, absent the failings of counsel.”); id. (“The
expected post-trial sentence is imposed in only a few percent of cases. It is like the sticker price
for cars: only an ignorant, ill-advised consumer would view full price as the norm and anything
less a bargain.” (quoting Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1138)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
170. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1411 (stating that to prove Strickland prejudice, the defendant
needed to show a reasonable probability that the trial court would have accepted the earlier offer
to plead to a misdemeanor); see also Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387 (similar).
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severe”—that he received after trial.171
Writing in dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia protested the majority’s
“outcome-based test for prejudice.”172 The Sixth Amendment, Scalia
argued, “is concerned not with the fairness of bargaining but with the
fairness of conviction.”173 Justice Scalia objected that the majority was
constitutionalizing plea-bargaining rather than testing the validity of an
accepted plea.174 Because the constitution provides no right to pleabargain, he maintained, no constitutional violation could arise from a
lost opportunity to accept a plea offer.175 In contrast, the majority’s
approach is more practical, less formalistic, and more attuned to how
plea-bargaining impacts every case, not just those resulting in a guilty
plea.176
The majority’s outcomes-based analysis reflects, more broadly, that
plea-bargaining encompasses all aspects of adjudication.177 The
dissenters’ procedural-based approach features guilt adjudication as an
isolated, in-court event, divorced from charging and sentencing.178 In
fact, as the majority acknowledges, these phases get absorbed
informally in the “horse trading” of plea-bargaining, in which chargeand sentence-bargaining drive negotiations.179 Further, none of this
happens in court. Instead, plea-bargaining occurs privately without
“formal court proceedings” or “judicial supervision.”180 Lafler and Frye
acknowledge that plea-bargaining is a critical phase in every case,
whether the conviction is obtained by guilty plea or trial verdict, and,
unlike other critical phases, plea-bargaining is informal, off-the-record,
and occurs outside court.
In addition to establishing that plea outcomes (not post-trial
sentences) are the norm, the Court in Lafler made the important
assumption that trial courts know the “going rate” for plea bargains in
their jurisdictions.181 If this assumption is accurate, a trial judge is well
171. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1386–87.
172. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1412 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 1414.
174. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1394–95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. Id.; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1412–14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176. See Bibas, supra note 20, at 154.
177. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text; cf. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 164, at 1912) (internal quotation marks omitted) (asserting that pleabargaining “is the criminal justice system”).
178. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1414 (“[The plea-bargaining process] happens not to be,
however, a subject covered by the Sixth Amendment, which is concerned not with the fairness
of bargaining but with the fairness of conviction.”).
179. Id. at 1407 (quoting Scott & Stuntz, supra note 164, at 1912).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1410 (“It can be assumed that in most jurisdictions prosecutors and judges are
familiar with the boundaries of acceptable plea bargains and sentences.”); see also Bibas, supra
note 20, at 154 (discussing the Court’s observation in Lafler that defendants reasonably expect
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positioned to reject a plea if she suspects ineffective assistance of
counsel has distorted the result. And if the plea is later the focus of a
Strickland claim in post-conviction proceedings, the court could rely on
the local “going rates” as a key factor in analyzing prejudice.182
3. Remedying and Preventing Lawyer Incompetence
The Court suggested in Lafler that separation of powers concerns
may need to yield to the Court’s emerging Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence. Though the traditional remedy for a Strickland claim is a
new trial, this obviously would not have fixed the problem in Lafler
since the defendant’s goal was to restore the earlier plea offer. In Lafler,
the Court suggested that a prosecutor might be required to reoffer the
earlier plea offer to remedy a Sixth Amendment violation.183 Charging
is a prosecutorial function, so it is rare for the Court to force a
prosecutor’s hand on charging.184 Constitutional protections, such as
equal protection and due process, limit prosecutorial discretion but are
difficult to enforce.185 Lafler suggests that the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel also limits prosecutorial discretion at
least at the remedial stage.
The Court in Lafler considered two remedial pathways: resentencing
and reoffering a plea bargain.186 It stated, “Sixth Amendment remedies
should be narrowly ‘tailored to the injury suffered from the
constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on
competing interests.’”187 If, absent the error, a defendant would have
received a lesser sentence for the same offense, a court could remedy
that error at resentencing.188 But the remedy is more complicated if,
the “going rate established by the functioning market”).
182. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410 (suggesting that trial courts rely on their familiarity “with
the boundaries of acceptable plea bargains and sentences” to assess Strickland prejudice).
183. Id. at 1389.
184. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
185. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1996) (stating that equal
protection and due process forbid racially discriminatory prosecutions); North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969) (holding that due process forbids vindictive prosecutions),
overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989); see also Angela J.
Davis, Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: The Role of the Prosecutor, 39 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 202, 213 (2007) (describing the high burden defendants face in proving
“selective” discriminatory prosecution under Armstrong).
186. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389 (noting that the injury suffered comes in at least “two
forms”).
187. Id. at 1388–89 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981)).
188. See id. at 1389 (“[T]he court may exercise discretion in determining whether the
defendant should receive the term of imprisonment the government offered in the plea, the
sentence he received at trial, or something in between.”); see also Jenia Iontcheva Turner,
Effective Remedies for Ineffective Assistance, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 949, 950 (2013)
(critiquing Lafler because it affords trial courts discretion in deciding whether to remedy a
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absent the error, the defendant would have pled to a lesser charge, or if
the court lacks discretion, due to a mandatory sentencing statute, to
adjust the sentence.189 To remedy a constitutional violation in those
circumstances a court may “require the prosecution to reoffer the plea
proposal.”190 Thus, a court may force a prosecutor to reoffer an earlier
plea offer to remedy a specific Sixth Amendment violation.
The Frye Court suggested trial-level reforms to prevent ineffective
assistance of counsel in plea-bargaining.191 One way to ensure the
defendant is well-informed of his plea options, the Court said, is to put
more on the record at the guilty plea proceeding or before trial—to
include, for example, the defendant’s understanding of the process that
led to the plea, “the advantages and disadvantages of accepting it, and
the sentencing consequences or possibilities that will ensue.”192 Some
jurisdictions follow another tactic: Plea offers are put in writing and
made part of the record before a final plea or trial so any
miscommunications can be aired and possibly remedied at the trial court
level.193 These improvements would aid the flow of information
between the defendant, prosecutor, and judge.
Lafler and Frye set the stage for reforms designed to identify or
avoid ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial level, which also
could prevent or curb related ineffective assistance of counsel claims in
post-conviction.
D. Toward Outcome-Based Regulation
Lafler and Frye begin a new era of plea-bargaining regulation under
the Sixth Amendment, in which outcomes are a key feature. The
Supreme Court has recognized that plea-bargaining is a critical phase of
nearly every case, since so few cases go to trial. Strickland has gained a
new independence, so that it stands on its own and is not merely an
adjunct to ensure due process (in the guilty phase) or a fair trial. The
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel provides a
separate, cognizable basis to challenge a conviction, even if the in-court
adjudication is valid. Importantly, the prejudice test from Lafler and
Frye is outcome-based: The defendant must show that absent deficient
counsel, he would have received a shorter sentence or less serious
Strickland violation).
189. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389 (citing Williams v. Jones, 571 F.3d 1086, 1088 (10th Cir.
2009); Riggs v. Fairman, 399 F.3d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc granted, 430 F.3d
1222 (9th Cir. 2005), and appeal voluntarily dismissed, 2006 WL 6903784 (9th Cir. Apr. 14,
2006)).
190. Id.
191. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012).
192. Id. at 1406.
193. Id. at 1409.
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conviction.
As this robust Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has been evolving,
separation of powers concerns have been muted. A primary justification
for the Court’s hands-off approach to plea-bargaining is that prosecutors
control charging, so the Court has not regulated aggressive charge
bargaining and threats in the plea-negotiation phase that are intended to
induce guilty pleas. The Court’s attitude about the trial penalty—the
severe sentence risk of going to trial—may also be shifting. The Court
regards plea-based sentences as the norm and a better yardstick for what
prosecutors deem fair. And, at least at the remedial phase, the
prosecutor may be ordered to reoffer or recharge an offense to remedy a
Sixth Amendment violation.
Finally, though Lafler and Frye address Sixth Amendment
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the post-conviction phase,
trial courts will serve as the locus of reform.194 Trial judges have
specialized expertise, the Court said, in the going rate for plea bargains
in their jurisdictions.195 And trial-based reforms may play a significant
role in regulating plea-bargaining by improving representation and
catching ineffective assistance of counsel before the judgment is final.
Even in post-conviction, trial judges familiar with local plea-bargaining
will identify instances in which prejudice can be established.
II. RETHINKING APPROACHES TO REFORM
Lafler and Frye shift the paradigm for regulating guilty plea
adjudication on several different scales. They recognize that conviction
by guilty plea is the overwhelming norm, as has been true for decades.
Lafler and Frye embrace a broad and flexible approach to the Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel and recognize
that trial court procedural reforms can prevent violations. And while the
right to counsel is procedural, the Court’s emergent prejudice analysis
underscores that outcomes are key to identifying and remedying Sixth
Amendment violations. Part III of this Article proposes that courts can
implement an outcome-based approach to monitoring plea-bargaining
that integrates constitutional concerns into the plea-bargaining market.
To set the stage for that proposal, this Part explores how constitutional
norms and plea-bargaining fit together.
Several features of plea-bargaining, including its highly adaptive
culture and blending of procedural and substantive law, make it
particularly challenging for courts to regulate. Proposals to reform pleabargaining oversight tend to fall into two categories: some build on the
194. See Bibas, supra note 20, at 167–69 (suggesting that various actors, including
legislatures, bar organizations, and prosecutors, could reform the trial court process).
195. Frye, 132 S Ct. at 1410 (“It can be assumed that in most jurisdictions prosecutors and
judges are familiar with the boundaries of acceptable plea bargains and sentences.”).
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market model, while others insist on the need for constitutional norms
or procedures. There is a natural tension between these approaches
because the market tends to convert procedural rights into bargaining
chips that defendants may use, through waiver, to purchase better
outcomes. A central question is whether courts can meaningfully check
the market to ensure constitutional norms, such as accuracy, fairness,
and proportionality. This proposal envisions courts monitoring
outcomes as a check against prosecutorial advantage and deficient
counsel.
A. Plea-Bargaining Eats Everything
Regulating plea-bargaining is a complex task because it blends
criminal adjudication, a thicket in its own right, with market-based
negotiation. History has shown that plea-bargaining is forceful and
adaptive and that it has evolved and grown organically.196 Institutional
actors adapt to plea-bargaining, and plea-bargaining adapts to changes
in criminal law and procedure.197 As a practical matter, any proposal to
regulate plea-bargaining must be contemplated in terms of how it will
be absorbed into and manipulated by the plea-bargaining.198 Pleabargaining will continue to thrive regardless of the form of regulation;
the question is whether effective regulation can be designed to improve
the accuracy and fairness of the plea-bargaining market.
1. The Adaptability of Plea-Bargaining
That plea rates have been remarkably steady amid other changes in
criminal law and procedure suggests that plea-bargaining is adaptive in
two related ways. Plea-bargaining incorporates changes in criminal law
and procedure while consistently generating agreements. And
institutional players adapt to the practice of plea-bargaining based on
independent but often reinforcing interests.
Several scholars have traced the rise and entrenchment of pleabargaining over the past century.199 Though plea-bargaining was not
widely practiced before the late 1800s, it blossomed at the turn of the

196. See Fisher, supra note 20, at 1019–20 (noting examples of bargaining in the English
courts during the eighteenth century in which victims would sometimes accept cash payments in
exchange for abandoning prosecution).
197. Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7–10
(1979); see, e.g., id. at 891 (noting that “charge bargaining appeared almost as soon as a public
prosecutor found he had the power to accomplish it”).
198. See Bibas, supra note 20, at 173 (praising Lafler and Frye because they “reinforce the
actors’ incentives and customary dispositions rather than attempting to rewire them”).
199. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 197; Fisher, supra note 20; Lawrence M. Friedman,
Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 247 (1979).
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century and was well established by the 1920s.200 By 1925, almost 90%
of convictions in federal court were obtained by guilty plea201 and that
rate remained steady until the early-1990s.202 Today, 94% of felony
state convictions are obtained by guilty plea, with even higher rates in
the federal system.203 Long before Lafler and Frye, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that the vast majority of cases are resolved by guilty
plea.204
Plea-bargaining readily absorbs changes in law and procedure.
Adjustments to the legal rights of defendants may significantly impact
the substance of negotiations, but the basic calculations of risk
avoidance on both sides remain. Professor Albert W. Alschuler
correlated the rise in guilty plea convictions in the 1920s with the
expansion of substantive criminal law in the early part of the twentieth
century, including federal prohibition.205 The practice flourished in
urban counties and involved corrupt practices on all sides, with police
officers, plea “fixers,” magistrates, and punishment-based pricing by
defense lawyers all in the mix of bargained-for convictions.206
In plea-bargaining, procedural rights intended to protect the
defendant, check executive power, and assure accurate results are

200. Alschuler, supra note 197, at 5–6 (sketching this history); id. at 27 (documenting that
in urban jurisdictions in Virginia, guilty plea convictions accounted for half of all convictions in
1917 and three-quarters of all convictions by 1927). For more detailed treatment of the early
history of plea-bargaining, see generally id. at 7–26.
201. Id. at 27. By contrast, from 1908–1915, about 50% of convictions in federal court
were by guilty plea.
202. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 105, tbl. 5.22.2010,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf (providing information for federal courts
from 1945–2010 that shows guilty plea rates increased rapidly during 1991–1999 to new highs,
and continued increasing, though more slowly, during 2000–2010).
203. Id. tbl. 5.24.2010, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5242010.pdf (reporting that
guilty pleas resolved over 97% of convictions in federal criminal cases in 2010); id. tbl.
5.46.2006, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5462006.pdf (reporting that 94% of state
felony convictions in 2006 resulted from guilty pleas).
204. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399,
1407 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010); Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 752 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 n.7 (1969); cf. Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361–62 (1978) (acknowledging the importance of the guilty plea in the
criminal justice system).
205. Alschuler, supra note 197, at 32 (observing that, in 1912, half of Chicago defendants
were arrested for crimes that did not exist twenty-five years earlier and that the Wickersham
Commission reported that federal prohibition had created a high-volume guilty plea machinery
in federal courts); see also Fisher, supra note 20, at 917–19 (arguing that plea-bargaining started
with the development of liquor laws and the resultant massive expansion of criminal law for
relatively victimless crime, then spread to murder and eventually to all parts of the criminal
code).
206. Alschuler, supra note 197, at 24–26.
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converted to bargaining chips within the plea process.207 This is so
because the government may seek to extract a price for a defendant
exercising procedural rights; conversely, a defendant is able to gain a
better outcome by forgoing procedures. The procedural rights revolution
of the 1960s increased judicial oversight of criminal adjudication in the
trial court and on appeal.208 With increased constitutional protections,
defendants enjoyed greater access to counsel and were afforded
remedies for constitutional violations.209 These developments expanded
procedural protection for defendants and gave prosecutors an additional
incentive to bargain.210 Just as a factually weak case would enable the
defendant to negotiate for a better deal, the defendant could also trade
his procedural rights—such as the right to move for suppression of
illegally seized evidence or warrantless arrest, the right to jury trial, or
the right to appeal.211 With a guilty plea, the prosecutor could avoid the
risk of not having a viable case to bring (due to suppression of
evidence), losing his case (due to acquittal), or having a conviction
reversed on appeal (due to pretrial or trial error).212 Because of the way
protections for defendants get incorporated into the plea bargains, some
academics are cautious about increasing the number of rights or judicial
controls that will, in short order, have a neutral or deleterious impact on
defendants who exercise them.213
Prosecutors strengthened their bargaining advantage in the 1980s as
substantive legal changes gave them the upper hand and pushed plea
rates even higher. Prosecutors attained greater negotiating power in the
courtroom under tough drug, mandatory minimum sentence, habitual
207. Barkow, supra note 66, at 996–97 (stating that, under plea-bargaining, “prosecutors
are allowed to put a price on the defendant’s exercise of the judicial check, which is a key
element in the separation of powers”).
208. Alschuler, supra note 197, at 38–40 (describing the impacts of the “due process
revolution” on plea-bargaining).
209. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3044 n.28 (2010) (summarizing the
incorporation of constitutional criminal rights to the states); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,
27 (1972) (noting that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is applicable to the states);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel to the states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 346–50 (1961) (affirming the constitutional
origins of the rules excluding evidence that was obtained without a warrant from criminal trials).
210. Alschuler, supra note 197, at 38.
211. See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neil, Appeal Waivers and the Future of
Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 250 (2005).
212. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (holding by implication that, except
in cases of reversal based on insufficiency of the evidence, a court of appeal reversing on
procedural grounds will remand for a new trial).
213. See Fisher, supra note 20, at 1066 (“[E]very new right [conferred by the courts]
supplied a new axis along which a bargain could be struck.”); see also Bibas, supra note 20, at
172 (invoking the work of Professor William Stuntz, who argued that constitutionalizing the
plea-bargaining process might have the perverse effect of harming defendants).
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offender, and sentencing laws that constrained judicial sentencing
discretion.214 These new laws gave defendants greater incentive to strike
plea bargains to avoid severe sentencing consequences that flow from
charging choices. Since the 1980s, federal plea rates have increased
from approximately 87% to 97%.215
Even as guilty plea rates have remained steady or increased, plea
outcomes have become more severe. Since the 1980s, the expansion and
aggressive enforcement of criminal laws has dramatically increased the
number of defendants prosecuted and the lengths of prison terms
imposed.216 Today guilty pleas occur in a high-stakes environment
where long prison terms, severe collateral consequences, and extremely
limited resources (such as crowded courtrooms and overburdened
defense counsel) are common.217 In this environment, trials are
extremely rare and can carry severe consequences. As a result, most
defendants conclude today (as they have for decades) that conviction is
214. Traum, supra note 7, at 450–51.
215. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 105, tbl. 5.22.2010,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf. Likewise, guilty plea rates have increased
to 95% of all state convictions. THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2006, at
10 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2193.
216. See Traum, supra note 7, at 430 n.38 (“The per-day incarceration rate jumped from
133 per 100,000 in 1980 to 387 per 100,000 in 1994, and then to 762 per 100,000 in 2008.”); see
also MARGARET WERNER CAHALAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
HISTORICAL CORRECTIONS STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1850–1984, at 54 tbl. 3-24 (1986),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/pr/102529.pdf (reporting that, in the early 1980s,
state offenders served a median of sixteen to seventeen months before first release); FRANKLIN
E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 120 fig. 5.1 (1991) (showing
graphically the total prison population and rate of imprisonment from 1949–1988); Bruce
Western & Christopher Wildeman, The Black Family and Mass Incarceration, 621 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 221, 225 (2009) (“Because the system of criminal sentencing had come
to rely so heavily on incarceration, an arrest in the late 1990s was far more likely to lead to
prison time than at the beginning of the prison boom in 1980.”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, The Nation’s Prison Population Grew Almost 9 Percent Last Year (Aug. 9, 1995),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/press/PI94.PR (reporting large increases). See generally
PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PRISON COUNT 2010: STATE POPULATION DECLINES FOR THE FIRST
TIME IN 38 YEARS (2010), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_report_detail.aspx?
id=57797.
By 2006, the median felony sentence in state court was more than four years. Cf. COHEN &
KYCKELHAHN, supra note 215, at 13 (“Among offenders convicted of a felony and sentenced to
prison, the mean sentence was 49 months and the median was 24 months.”).
217. See Traum, supra note 7, at 429–30, 431–33, 440 (discussing long prison sentences
and collateral consequences); Cara H. Drinan, Lafler and Frye: Good News for Public Defense
Litigation, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 138, 139 (2012) (noting evidence that one public defender had
no opportunity to brief 40%–50% of his clients before they pled guilty). See generally Heather
Baxter, Gideon’s Ghost: Providing the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel in Times of
Budgetary Crisis, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 341 (detailing the indigent defense crisis and related
litigation).

2014]

USING OUTCOMES TO REFRAME GUILTY PLEA ADJUDICATION

857

either a certainty or poses a significant risk. They plead guilty to “cut
their losses.”218 It is a fair prediction that increased regulation of guilty
pleas would have the potential to modify plea outcomes but would not
likely alter plea rates.
2. Institutional Players and Their Incentives
Enhancing or redefining the role of the judges in guilty plea
adjudication may prove difficult because they are integral to supporting
the guilty plea system. Plea-bargaining is deeply entrenched in the
criminal courts, and its success relies on institutional players—judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys—doing their part.219 For these repeat
players, plea-bargaining collapses and displaces their traditional trialbased institutional roles and has, over time, assigned them important
roles in the guilty plea system.220
In trial adjudication, the discrete tasks of charging, convicting, and
sentencing involve different institutional players acting as checks on the
others. In the traditional model, prosecutors charge (often with judicial
or grand jury oversight), juries or judges convict (holding the prosecutor
to a high burden of proof), and judges impose sentences. Even in the
traditional trial adjudication model, prosecutors’ broad charging
discretion is minimally checked and can dictate the outcome of the case,
including the sentence.221 Still, the formal, discrete phases of charging,
adjudication, and sentencing keep the prosecutor’s obligations
transparent to the court, the defendant, and the public.222 Such
transparency operates as a check on executive power to charge, convict,
and imprison.223
Plea-bargaining displaces these institutional roles and consolidates
them, often unchecked, in the prosecutor.224 The prosecutor may
effectively control all three functions—charging, adjudication, and

218. See Fisher, supra note 20, at 1042.
219. BIBAS, MACHINERY, supra note 23, at 31; see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense
Attorney’s Role in Plea-Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1229–30 (1975) (describing
institutional advantages of public defenders who have better information about prosecutors and
judges compared to retained counsel).
220. Alschuler, supra note 219, at 1206–08.
221. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“In our system, so long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by
statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand
jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”).
222. See Barkow, supra note 66, at 994.
223. Id. Contra BIBAS, MACHINERY, supra note 23, at 31 (“In practice . . . the public and
victims have little role in criminal prosecution and so cannot constrain prosecutors. Prosecutors
draw their fixed salaries regardless of how satisfied victims and the public are.”).
224. Barkow, supra note 66, at 996–97.
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sentencing—and thus displace the role of judge and jury.225 The
prosecutor has wide latitude to add, reduce, dismiss, or substitute
charges during plea-bargaining with little oversight.226 The defendant
waives his right to trial, pre-guilt legal issues, and, often, appellate
review.227 The entire plea is often structured around the substantive
outcome, namely, the charge of conviction and the sentence. The
judge’s role at sentencing is diminished, as the court may be required by
statute to impose a particular sentence based on the charge or it may
choose to impose the sentence contemplated by the parties because of
its customary, supportive role in the guilty plea system.228
Judges and defense counsel reinforce, rather than check, this
consolidation of prosecutorial power. Defense lawyers quickly adapt
themselves to the plea-bargaining culture in a given court and embrace
plea-bargaining’s flexibility, expediency, and relative fairness,
especially compared to trial.229 Their detailed knowledge of the system,
plea bargains, and trial risks are their stock-in-trade.230 Professor
George Fisher posits that several features of the modern criminal justice
system, including public defender offices, either were conceived or
evolved to support plea-bargaining as the primary mode of case
adjudication.231
Judges have adapted to plea-bargaining culture based on their own
set of incentives. Historically, judges resisted plea-bargaining and later
treated it neutrally at sentencing.232 Over time, however, judges
cooperated in the practice through sentence-bargaining by rewarding
defendants who pled guilty with lower sentences than those convicted at
trial of the same crimes.233 Judges came to appreciate the many
225. Id. at 994–95 (arguing that the current lack of checks on prosecutorial power in the
criminal law is at odds with textual and historical support for separating criminal law functions
among the three branches with judges having a strong role in enforcing that separation).
226. Id. at 996–97; see also Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364–65.
227. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
228. See Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 6, at 10 (observing that most judges “rubberstamp[] the bargain and sentence”). In federal cases, mandatory minimum sentences apply in
approximately 27.2% of criminal cases, subject to narrow exceptions. U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM xxvii
(2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Test
imony_and_Reports/Mandatory_Minimum_Penalties/20111031_RtC_PDF/Executive_Summary.pdf.
229. MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES,
AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 90–91 (1978).
230. Cf. BIBAS, MACHINERY, supra note 23, at 31–32.
231. Fisher, supra note 20, at 1063–64.
232. Alschuler, supra note 197, at 19–24 (noting that, historically, courts were suspicious
of plea-bargaining, in part because of its close connection to forced confessions); Fisher, supra
note 20, at 984 (noting that judges did not aid plea-bargaining before the last quarter of the
nineteenth century).
233. Fisher, supra note 20, at 986–87.
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advantages of guilty pleas, especially as expanded procedural
protections generated more criminal appeals: Guilty pleas were more
efficient, posed no risk of trial error or reversal on appeal, and virtually
eliminated the risk of a wrongful conviction.234 Because “plea
bargaining by its very nature hides both factual and legal error,” it
protects the reputation of the system as a whole by affirming that the
guilty are convicted without errors.235 Judges also embrace pleabargaining to manage a high caseload and curry popularity with local
attorneys.236 In this culture, judges and prosecutors share aligned
incentives to ensure that plea-bargaining thrives, and a corollary interest
in avoiding jury trials.237
Plea-bargaining has displaced and redefined the trial-based
institutional roles of judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, and
collapsed the procedures that operate to check prosecutorial advantage.
The guilty plea canvass stands as a moment of essential, direct contact
between the court and defendant at the guilty plea hearing, but it does
not check, or even record, the plea-bargaining process that preceded it.
Thus, an essential challenge of reform is reframing the purpose of guilty
plea procedures and the roles of institutional players who perform them.
The Supreme Court’s recognition in Lafler and Frye that ours “is for the
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials,”238 opens the door to
tailoring constitutional doctrine, such as Strickland, to fit this reality.
B. Approaches to Reform
Critics of plea-bargaining share some common concerns but
advocate different pathways for reform.239 Common concerns include:
234. Id. at 1040–43.
235. Id. at 1043.
236. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1102 (1976) (describing judicial plea-bargaining); id. at 1081 (noting that
a high level of guilty pleas might still be maintained without severely penalizing all defendants
who are convicted after trial because defendants value the reduction in uncertainty a plea
creates); id. at 1087–88 (noting that, in Chicago state courts, judges would state to counsel what
the sentence would be if the defendant pled guilty); id. at 1089 (noting “the fact that the
defendant’s sentence would be higher after conviction at trial was implicit, not explicit”); id. at
1093 (describing how some judges had a “semi-official ‘schedule’ of penalties”).
237. Id. at 1102–03 (noting that plea-bargaining relieves “the administrative pressures that
beset the prosecutors as forcefully as they beset the judges themselves”).
238. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012), quoted in Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct.
1399, 1407 (2012).
239. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 219, at 1313–14 (arguing that plea-bargaining should
be abolished in favor of jury trials); Appleman, supra note 46, at 747–50 (arguing that a
community jury should preside over pleas); Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market,
supra note 23, at 1151–52 (advocating a consumer protection model of information
enhancement in the plea process); Bibas, Extrajudicial Reforms, supra note 20, at 152
(advocating a range of voluntary and rule-based reforms); Stephen J. Schulholfer, Plea
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(1) prosecutorial control over plea-bargaining;240 (2) powerful
incentives to plead guilty can result in conviction of the innocent, or
negatively impact less culpable defendants;241 and (3) lack of oversight,
transparency, and judicial review of plea-bargaining can make it
difficult to assess whether a plea bargain is skewed by prosecutorial
overreaching, lack of information, ineffective defense counsel, or other
factors.242 In their approaches to reform, critics tend to fall into two
schools: some propose injecting constitutional norms or procedures into
the plea-bargaining process, while others propose market-enhancing
reforms.
The proposals discussed below come from scholars who view pleabargaining as an important, though flawed, method of criminal
adjudication. At one end of the spectrum are those who would eliminate
the practice and at the other are those who champion its virtues.
Abolitionists maintain that plea-bargaining cannot be reconciled with
fundamental values in criminal adjudication.243 For example, Professor
Stephen J. Schulholfer argues for abolition of plea-bargaining on
grounds that a neutral fact finder should determine guilt and
punishment, defendants should not be pressured to plead guilty, and
defendants should be represented by agents with aligned interests.244
Champions of plea-bargaining view it as an efficient and cost-effective
system that affords defendants an important choice.245 In this view,
trials are costly, time-intensive, and divert scarce judicial, prosecutorial,
Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1979–80 (1992) (critiquing plea-bargaining and
arguing that it should be abolished); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 164, at 1950–51 (advocating
revision of plea-bargaining doctrine to include contract-based analysis to normalize results and
enhance innocence sorting).
240. Barkow, supra note 66, at 1044 (arguing that unreviewable prosecutorial discretion at
charge bargaining “stands in sharp tension with the separation of powers”); Marc L. Miller,
Domination and Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1252
(2004) (arguing that mandatory federal sentencing guidelines gave federal prosecutors “virtually
absolute power” over sentencing).
241. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Barkow, supra note 66, at 1034); Scott &
Stuntz, supra note 164, at 1911 (arguing that “impediments to efficient bargain[ing] . . . . lead[ ]
predictably to innocent defendants being offered (and taking) the same deals as guilty ones”).
242. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1125–27.
243. Alschuler, supra note 236, at 1061 (“Although my own view is that the institution of
plea-bargaining can and should be abolished, the Article tentatively accepts the opposite view
and examines how a system of plea bargaining should be structured.”); id. at 1119 (“That plea
negotiation . . . collapses the adjudicative and sentencing functions into one is simply an
unavoidable defect of the process.”); see, e.g., Kenneth Kipnis, Plea Bargaining: A Critic’s
Rejoinder, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 555, 557–58 (1979) (arguing that plea-bargaining is counter to
the ideals of the Anglo-American justice system).
244. Schulhofer, supra note 239, at 2009.
245. Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1976–78
(1992).
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and defense resources from other cases.246 Plea bargains offer
defendants autonomy on an important life decision that affects their
liberty.247 Since society protects individuals’ ability to make other
weighty life choices, defendants must be permitted to determine the
outcome of their own case.248
Even proponents recognize that plea-bargaining is imperfect and
creates incentives that compel innocent defendants to plead guilty.249
Justice Scalia acknowledged that plea-bargaining “presents grave risks
of prosecutorial overcharging that effectively compels an innocent
defendant to avoid massive risk by pleading guilty.”250 But, he stated, it
is a “necessary evil,” without which “our system of criminal justice
would grind to a halt.”251 Others argue that the structural
“imperfections” in plea-bargaining merely “reflect the imperfections of
an anticipated trial.”252 If trials were perfect, the argument goes, guilty
defendants would avoid them and innocent defendants would insist on
them.253 Since trials are imperfect and the sentencing consequences
after trial can be severe, defendants, even those who may be innocent or
have a defense, opt to plead guilty to manage these risks.254
The opinions in Lafler and Frye highlight the debate about whether
plea-bargaining should be regulated under the Constitution and, if so,
what reforms might be effective. The majority embraced at least a
partial constitutional approach, holding defense counsel accountable for
prejudicial ineffective assistance during plea-bargaining without
dictating specific constitutional reforms.255 Justice Scalia acknowledged
that plea-bargaining is “a subject worthy of regulation,” but not
protected under the Sixth Amendment.256 Scholars are also divided on
whether to rely on constitutional norms or market-based concepts to
reform and regulate plea-bargaining.

246. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
247. Easterbrook, supra note 245, at 1976–77.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1971–72, 1975, 1978; Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect
Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent Defendants, 101 YALE L.J. 2011 (1992) (noting that
“both trials and bargains are flawed”); see also, Brady, 397 U.S. at 758 (stating that guilty plea
convictions are “no more foolproof than full trials to the court or to the jury”).
250. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
251. Id. (citing Alschuler, supra note 197, at 38).
252. Easterbrook, supra note 245, at 1978.
253. Id. at 1970–72.
254. Id. at 1975.
255. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408–11 (2012) (finding counsel deficient under
Strickland for failure to communicate plea offer and suggesting trial court and legislative
reforms).
256. Id. at 1413–14 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting legislators are appropriate bodies to
create “sub-constitutional” reforms).
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1. Constitutional Reformers
One school of reformers seeks to inject constitutional norms into the
guilty plea process. Professors Rachel Barkow and Laura Appleman
offer different approaches to address common concerns.257 Each injects
a traditional constitutional check on prosecutorial advantage that is
currently missing from the process. Professor Barkow relies on judicial
authority, while Professor Appleman proposes a “plea jury” to restore
transparency and community involvement to criminal adjudication.
Professor Barkow asserts that structural separation of powers
safeguards are absent in criminal law, especially in plea-bargaining.258
This absence is especially stark in plea-bargaining because prosecutors
dictate the charges and often the sentence without a judicial check.259
Professor Barkow argues, “[J]udges have become desensitized to a
criminal justice system in which prosecutors exercise extensive judicial
power.”260 Instead of relying on institutional checks, criminal
adjudication relies on individual procedural rights as the primary
(though inadequate) mechanism to prevent government overreaching,261
and prosecutors routinely condition guilty pleas on the defendant’s
waiver of those constitutional rights.262 Checks on prosecutorial power,
such as the right to trial, are thus subsumed in the plea-bargaining
process, avoiding judicial oversight.263
Professor Barkow suggests that one way to redress this problem is to
reframe the court’s inquiry at the guilty plea hearing. When defendants
plead guilty, the real question should not be whether their plea is
knowing and intelligent, “but whether there is a sufficient check on
prosecutors’ use of the bargaining power.”264 Currently, Professor
Barkow answers, there is no such check on the structural relationship
between the branches.265
Professor Barkow’s proposal redresses the problem of collapse and
displacement of institutional roles in plea-bargaining. She reimagines
the court at the guilty plea hearing as playing a more active role, one
that is focused not merely on the individual process choice and related
waiver of rights by the individual defendant (the status quo), but on a
broader, constitutional concern of checking prosecutorial power.
Because courts have become accustomed in the plea context to
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Barkow, supra note 66, at 994–95; Appleman, supra note 46, at 747–50.
Barkow, supra note 66, at 996–97.
Id.
Id. at 1038.
Id. at 1033–34.
Id. at 1046.
Id. at 1049.
Id.
Id.
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prosecutors exercising such broad power, Professor Barkow’s proposal
would require courts to reassert their institutional role within the guilty
plea process.266 Professor Barkow does not detail whether this judicial
check on prosecutorial authority would be primarily procedural in
nature or include a substantive review of the charges, bargaining, or the
sentence. Her proposal is more conceptual in that it contemplates that
courts could more actively monitor guilty plea adjudication in a manner
that is consistent with their institutional judicial role of checking
executive power and protecting individual rights.
Professor Appleman contemplates the creation of the plea jury as an
alternative constitutional check on prosecutorial power. Professor
Appleman derives the concept of a “plea jury” from the Sixth
Amendment, which, she argues, confers a community right to jury
trial.267A key feature of this broader community right is that it is not the
defendant’s right to waive.268 So, Professor Appleman argues, a
defendant’s waiver of a jury trial does not sever the community’s right
to hear his case.269 Professor Appleman proposes that the defendant
would allocute to the plea jury, which, with some judicial oversight,
could decide whether to accept the plea.270 The goal would be to
integrate plea-bargaining with “classical criminal-procedure values,”
including voluntariness, accountability, transparency, and community
participation,271 instead of the backroom and insider-dealing that
characterizes plea-bargaining. Compared to current practices, a plea jury
could be costly to implement and time-consuming for courts and
parties.272 Defendants, who might not welcome the plea jury’s
involvement in their case, could challenge the process or demand
safeguards that encumber the process. Still, the proposal is valuable in
that it seeks to inject community participation and constitutional norms
into guilty plea adjudication.
The proposals of Professors Appleman and Barkow share common
threads. Both seek to integrate plea-bargaining and constitutional norms
so that plea-bargaining better reflects deeply held, constitutional values
about governmental power, process, and liberty. Both share the notion
that criminal adjudication is not simply a private matter for the
defendant and the prosecutor to resolve. Instead, checks on
prosecutorial power and individual choice are essential to the
constitutional design and the public’s broader interest in criminal
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at 1036–38.
Appleman, supra note 46, at 736–37.
Id. at 744.
Id.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 769.
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enforcement, justice, fairness, and deployment of public resources.
Courts have an institutional, constitutional role to play even if the
defendant admits guilt (per Professor Barkow), and the community has
a stake (per Professor Appleman) in checking prosecutors’ power to
charge, adjudicate, and sentence individuals.
2. Market-Based Reformers
Other reformers build on the market model. Professor Stephanos
Bibas proposes market-based reforms that build on consumer protection
concepts, reinforce actors’ incentives, and rely on extrajudicial
regulatory controls.273 Professor Robert Scott and the late Professor
William Stuntz, in contrast, urged greater reliance on contract law
concepts and remedies to increase the efficiency and fairness of pleabargaining.274 These proposals share the laudable feature of trying to
identify and correct problems within the plea-bargaining market that can
skew results, such as the information and power asymmetry between the
prosecutor and defendant, and the risk–reward incentives that can cause
innocent defendants to plead guilty. They differ significantly, however,
in their view of the role that courts should play. Professor Bibas
envisions courts on the periphery of plea-bargaining reform.275
Professors Scott and Stuntz, by contrast, envision courts having a
hands-on, substantive role in monitoring outcomes to ensure that pleabargaining is actually fair and not skewed by prosecutorial advantage or
ineffective counsel.276
a. Reinforcing Shared Incentives
Professor Bibas emphasizes the need for reforms that will enhance a
defendant’s capacity to make a better informed decision on whether to
accept a plea bargain.277 Professor Bibas’s significant work on pleabargaining describes a market that is complex,278 mostly unregulated, 279
273. See Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1117; Bibas,
supra note 20, at 152–53.
274. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 164, at 1950–51.
275. See Bibas, supra note 20, at 152 (proposing that “nonjudicial actors (especially
prosecutors) will do much to solve plea bargaining’s problems prospectively”).
276. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 164, at 1952 (observing that defense counsel is key to
checking government overreaching); id. at 1931 (discussing fairness).
277. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1145–46.
278. Id. at 1120–21 (arguing that plea-bargaining is “far too complicated and opaque” for
most defendants to fully understand the choices presented to them).
279. See id. at 1120; see also BIBAS, MACHINERY, supra note 23, at 30–31 (describing how
plea-bargaining is run by insiders, professional prosecutors, and defenders, who are repeat
players, not traditional adversaries, and their actions are “largely insulated from oversight and
supervision” by courts, the public, or the defendants whose cases are at stake); Bibas, supra note
14, at 79 (describing the Court’s “laissez-faire, hands-off approach” to plea-bargaining); cf.
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and possibly ill-suited for court-led reforms.280 Unique aspects of pleabargaining distinguish it from other legal negotiations (or markets): the
amount of prosecutorial control over plea offers (charges and
sentencing), the variability of defense counsel, and informational gaps
defendants experience in considering a plea offer.281 Bibas’s proposals
for reform focus on three themes: (1) defendants need better, clearer
information about their options and related consequences;282 (2) timing
is critical because reforms must be designed to improve plea-bargaining
when it occurs in the pretrial stage, not after the fact;283 and (3) reforms
should focus on institutional actors’ existing incentives in the
marketplace.284
Consumer protection-inspired reforms, Professor Bibas argues,
would enhance a defendant’s capacity to assess plea offers.285 A host of
reforms could make the plea-bargaining process more transparent and
easier for defendants to comprehend. These include requiring plea
offers to be made in writing, making plea and trial consequences
(including possible jail or prison time) easier to comprehend, giving
defendants more time to consider a plea offer, and improving the quality
of defense counsel.286 Prosecutors could explain the basis for their
offers to the defendant and spell out likely sentencing consequences
before the plea is accepted.287 The quality of defense counsel could be
improved through training, use of checklists, and internal oversight.288
Timing is critical: Reforms need to occur in the pre-plea, pretrial
phase so that the problem of incompetent counsel is flagged before the
conviction and sentence are final. Professor Bibas predicts that Lafler
Bibas, supra note 166, at 2469–86 (describing how plea-bargaining outcomes are keyed not to
trial-outcome predictions, but a range of “structural distortions” that shape the parties’
bargaining incentives).
280. Bibas, supra note 20, at 152 (“Courts are poorly equipped to remedy woefully
inadequate defense lawyering on their own.”); see also id. at 174 (stating that nonjudicial actors
are “better suited” to implement plea-bargaining reforms).
281. See id.; cf. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1126–27
(noting “psychological biases and heuristics that color defendants’ assessments of their own
cases in plea bargaining”).
282. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1151–59.
283. Bibas, supra note 20, at 152–53.
284. Id. at 164–67; Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1144–
46.
285. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1151–59.
286. Id. at 1154–58.
287. Bibas, supra note 20, at 167 (citing Bibas, supra note 166, at 2525) (describing
prosecutor-led “reverse proffer sessions,” in which a prosecutor tells the defendant “how the
government would convict the defendant,” and suggesting that prosecutors might opt to disclose
more information in this unofficial setting than is legally required at the plea stage).
288. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1160 (suggesting
training and the use of checklists); Bibas, supra note 20, at 168 (suggesting internal defender
audits could “weed out the weakest lawyers”).
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and Frye will have a limited impact in practice because, as with all
Strickland claims, defendants face significant barriers when challenging
their conviction and sentence collaterally, after the fact.289 Defendants
must satisfy a demanding legal standard, and Professor Bibas suspects
that courts may be reluctant to overturn a conviction or grant much
relief.290 Meaningful reforms will need to be “proactive” measures
designed to ensure that defendants get competent advice in the first
place, that is, during the plea-bargaining stage.291 Professor Bibas
argues that nonjudicial actors, especially prosecutors, are better
positioned to implement reforms at the plea-bargaining stage.292
Professor Bibas’s proposals are prosecution-centric and largely
reinforce, rather than check, existing institutional roles in the pleabargaining marketplace. Observers of plea-bargaining, including
Professor Bibas, recognize that prosecutors currently dictate pleabargaining without any meaningful check on their power.293 Still,
Professor Bibas expresses confidence that prosecutors are appropriate
engines of reform because “their interests largely align with those of
defendants and the system” in terms of reaching fair deals and ensuring
that convictions withstand challenges on appeal and in post-conviction
proceedings. Defender organizations and judges share these same
incentives, he argues, of needing to move cases quickly and eliminating
the risk of post-judgment litigation.294
Professor Bibas is correct about shared incentives and wise to
contemplate reforms that “can work well because they go with the grain
of plea bargaining, not against it.”295 The downside of this approach is
that it reflects the status quo instead of altering it. Institutional actors
currently share all these same incentives, that is, moving cases and
avoiding judicial oversight, and it is precisely these shared incentives
that facilitate guilty plea adjudication without meaningful oversight
either before or after the fact. True, prosecutors are favorably positioned
to affect plea-bargaining, but this is because, as the most powerful
players in the process, they control it. Entrusting reform to prosecutors
without building in a check on their power may place too much faith in
289. Bibas, supra note 20, at 159–63.
290. Id. at 161–62.
291. Id. at 159.
292. Id. at 164–65, 167.
293. Barkow, supra note 66, at 996–97; Fisher, supra note 20, at 868; see Bibas, supra note
20, at 150; Schulhofer, supra note 239, at 1996–97.
294. Bibas, supra note 20, at 165–67 (citing as an example the impact of Padilla, which
requires defense counsel to advise the defendant of the risk of deportation before pleading
guilty). “Padilla warnings risk discouraging guilty pleas,” Bibas writes, but instead “the desire
to do the right thing and to obtain bulletproof convictions has trumped the fear of impeding
pleas.” Id. at 166–67.
295. Id. at 170.
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the existing market and result in insufficient will to challenge it.
Overall, Professor Bibas’s proposal features courts as relatively
weak actors in implementing plea-bargaining reform. This extrajudicial
approach may reflect two different concerns. The first is a desire to
avoid constitutionalizing the plea-bargaining process, which could stifle
creativity and flexibility and lead to the kind of rigid procedural
regulation that governs trial adjudication.296 The second is a desire to
keep regulation procedural and thus avoid court intervention in the
substance of pleas.297 Professor Bibas suggests that in Padilla the
Supreme Court for the first time began to “regulate plea bargaining’s
substantive calculus,” referring to the sentencing and “related collateral
civil consequences.”298 His proposed reforms would “regulate at least
the process if not the substance of plea bargaining.”299 Because “courts
can do little on their own,” Professor Bibas does not foresee courts
assuming a greater, substantive role in regulating plea outcomes.300 He
instead foresees a mixed menu of reforms designed to enhance market
functioning.301
b. Ensuring Market Prices
Though Professors Scott and Stuntz also fashion reforms on a market
model, they envision courts acting as market referees. Professors Scott
and Stuntz propose that courts at the plea stage “review not process but
outcomes.”302 This concept fits into a broader proposal that courts
should use contract-based principles to protect defendants against
prosecutorial advantage and defense attorney error—factors that
interfere with the parties’ ability to negotiate a fair outcome.303 Here,
the Article focuses on their outcomes proposal because it offers a
market-based justification for courts to regulate the substance of pleas.
Outcomes provide a good indicator of whether the plea market is
working or whether ineffective counsel or prosecutor advantage is
skewing results.304 According to Professors Scott and Stuntz, “Because
most attorney error affects the price of the plea rather than its existence,

296. See id. at 173 (criticizing the “Warren Court’s . . . command-and-control regulation”);
Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1152 (“[D]eveloping flexible
nonconstitutional responses might obviate further constitutional reforms.”).
297. See Bibas, supra note 20, at 171 (discussing concerns of courts becoming involved in
the substance of the guilty plea).
298. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1117.
299. Id.
300. Bibas, supra note 20, at 153.
301. Id. at 152–53.
302. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 164, at 1959.
303. Id. at 1967.
304. Id. at 1958–60.
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most attorney error does not amount to ineffective assistance.”305
Professors Scott and Stuntz wrote this some twenty years before Lafler
and Frye, when Hill provided the only avenue to challenge a guilty plea
under Strickland and required a defendant to show that with competent
counsel he would have refused to plead guilty and insisted on going to
trial.306 This remains true today, even after Lafler and Frye, because
most nonegregious errors by counsel will not satisfy the Strickland
standard.307
Professors Scott and Stuntz argue that outcomes, not procedural
analysis, provide a better gauge of whether the parties agreed to a fair
“price.”308 They assert that the “difference between a good and bad
deal” depends on (1) “knowledge of likely trial outcomes” and resulting
sentences, and (2) “a good sense of the going ‘market price’ of the
relevant category of crime—i.e., the sentence usually assigned after a
guilty plea in similar cases.”309 One problem is that the repeat players
(prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys) are well positioned to have
such knowledge, while defendants, especially inexperienced ones, are
not.310 Defense counsel’s knowledge about the marketplace may be the
key factor in achieving a fair result and more important than the time
the lawyer devoted to the case.311 In the marketplace, “bargaining skill
depends more on knowledge of information about other cases than on
case-specific preparation.”312
Because judges know the marketplace, they are well positioned to
identify plea outcomes that exceed the going rate.313 Professors Scott
and Stuntz argue that although a “judge is in a poor position to
supervise the bargaining process, . . . he is in a very good position to
recognize unusually high sentences.”314 In their view, a high sentence
should trigger judicial scrutiny—such as requiring an explanation from
the parties—and judges might suspect that defense attorney mistake is
to blame for the above-norm outcome.315
305. Id. at 1958.
306. Id. at 1957–58 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
307. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that, to satisfy the
Strickland test, counsel must make errors so serious so as to no longer function as “counsel”
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment); see also Hessick, supra note 165, at 147.
308. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 164, at 1959.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. (suggesting that judges are in a good position to identify unusually high sentences);
accord Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1410 (2012) (“It can be assumed that in most
jurisdictions prosecutors and judges are familiar with the boundaries of acceptable plea bargains
and sentences.”).
314. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 164, at 1959.
315. Id. at 1959–60.
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The approach of Professors Scott and Stuntz would give judges a
powerful, market-based role in regulating plea-bargaining. Judges could
use plea outcomes as an indicator for market factors, such as ineffective
defense counsel, that negatively impact the parties’ ability to negotiate a
fair result. Monitoring outcomes would be at once more direct and less
intrusive than overseeing plea-bargaining, which is time-consuming and
occurs out of court. By monitoring outcomes based on going market
prices, courts could correct more subtle differences in attorney error that
may separate good and bad deals, even while not rising to the level of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Indeed, Professors Scott and Stuntz
suggest that in all cases the bargained-for sentence should operate “as a
ceiling, but not a floor” and that “downward discretion should be
encouraged whenever the sentence is substantially above the ‘market
level’ in the relevant jurisdiction.”316
The proposal of Professors Scott and Stuntz places courts at the
center of the plea-bargaining market, with authority to shape the
substantive (not merely procedural) outcome of the case. This approach,
though market-based, reflects basic separation of powers concerns. It
explicitly abandons a process-based measure of fairness and instead
relies on “price” as a substantive measure of relative fairness within the
marketplace. This approach is imperfect in many ways since market
prices can be inflated, the plea-bargain market suffers from structural
power imbalances (such as prosecutorial advantage and overburdened
defender services) between the parties, and going rates can mask and
oversimplify important differences in cases that could or should affect
the substantive outcome. Professor Barkow suggests that courts at the
plea stage should be assessing “whether there is a sufficient check on
prosecutors’ use of the bargaining power.”317 The outcomes analysis
proposed by Professors Scott and Stuntz is one way for courts to
implement that inquiry.
III. MONITORING OUTCOMES IN THE TRIAL COURT
Lafler and Frye could usher in a new approach to regulating guilty
pleas that is both market-based and anchored by constitutional norms.
These cases confirm that courts enjoy robust authority to protect a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of
counsel. This authority, informed by the practical realities of pleabargaining, could reshape courts’ role in guilty plea adjudication. This
Part proposes that this shift in authority enables courts to play a more
active, hands-on role in ensuring that plea-bargaining results are
consistent with constitutional guarantees. It further proposes that courts
316. Id.
317. Barkow, supra note 66, at 1049.
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embrace an outcome-based approach to monitoring plea-bargaining that
builds on Professor Scott and Professor Stuntz’s proposal. Instead of
grounding this approach in contract doctrine, as they did, this Article
justifies it on the constitutional grounds of the Sixth Amendment right
to the effective assistance of counsel and separation of powers concerns.
The strengths of this model are that it goes “with the grain of pleabargaining, not against it,”318 is anchored by constitutional values, and
features courts playing a meaningful institutional role in the process.
Having courts review the substance of pleas, instead of merely
procedural aspects, is a substantial change from current practice. But
outcomes monitoring is justified for practical reasons because it builds
on courts’ market expertise, can be implemented at the trial court level,
and dovetails with courts’ traditional role of imposing a sentence.
This Part begins by describing the constitutional and theoretical
support for monitoring plea outcomes and then details how courts
would implement this approach in practice.
A. Trial Court Authority
Lafler and Frye lay the groundwork for trial courts to monitor plea
outcomes based on Sixth Amendment and separation of powers
concerns. Lafler and Frye make clear that the Sixth Amendment right to
the effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings is a robust
one that stands on its own. By delinking Sixth Amendment concerns
from due process analysis (in the plea context) and fair trial analysis (in
the trial context), the Court has signaled that the right to the effective
assistance of counsel is on equal footing with (and no longer dependent
on) other constitutional challenges to criminal convictions.319 Courts are
charged with protecting a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel, and outcomes are a useful proxy for
flagging instances of incompetent counsel prejudicing a case result.
Lafler and Frye also reframe separation of powers analysis in the
plea-bargaining context. As Professor Barkow’s work highlights,
separation of powers principles have played a weak role in the criminal
law, especially in plea-bargaining, with courts relying on individual
procedural rights as a check on prosecutorial power.320 Two
complementary assumptions justified the Court’s traditional hands-off
approach: Defendants with counsel will protect their own interests, and
courts must defer to prosecutorial charging decisions (provided those
decisions are constitutional and supported by probable cause).321
318. Bibas, supra note 20, at 170.
319. See supra Sections I.C–D (discussing Frye and Lafler).
320. Barkow, supra note 66, at 993, 1038.
321. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (describing how
prosecutorial charging decisions are not reviewable provided they are supported by probable
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Though courts traditionally exercised considerable power at sentencing,
today prosecutors dictate or constrain sentencing options through their
charging decisions.322 The plea bargain powerfully frames the
sentencing determination and once the plea is accepted, courts may have
very limited sentencing discretion to exercise.323 Viewing pleabargaining as primarily about charging and guilt ignores how the
practice eclipses judicial sentencing authority, an important institutional
check on executive power.
Lafler and Frye disrupt these settled assumptions about institutional
roles. In Lafler, the Court acknowledged that plea-bargaining is not
merely about guilt, it is about sentencing.324 The Court recognized that
the plea bargain frames the sentence and deficient counsel during pleabargaining can prejudice the substantive outcome of the case.325 The
Court also stated that to remedy a Sixth Amendment violation, a court
could require a prosecutor to “reoffer” an earlier plea offer.326 This
suggests that prosecutorial discretion must yield to the need to remedy
such right to counsel violations.
For reforms to be meaningful and actually prevent prejudicial
ineffective assistance claims, they must occur in the trial court and
focus on substantive outcomes, not procedural concerns. Lafler and
Frye set the stage for this by using outcomes, not guilt or the reliability
of the conviction, to assess prejudice based on Strickland.327 The
Court’s reliance on this outcomes-based prejudice test sends a strong
message to trial courts that outcomes are key, and that normalizing
outcomes is a way to eliminate post-conviction challenges based on
Strickland. This is because a defendant must prove both deficient
performance by counsel and prejudice to prove an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim based on Strickland.328 Regardless of deficient
cause and do not violate due process or equal protection).
322. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1127–29 (arguing
that the Supreme Court traditionally had “neglected the importance of sentencing to plea
bargaining”); cf. Barkow, supra note 66, at 1038.
323. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 6, at 10–11 (observing that judges routinely rubberstamp the plea bargain and sentence, and, even if a judge wanted to exercise discretion at
sentencing, is limited to “exercising discretion within the sentencing range left open by the
bargain”).
324. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (“[T]he right to adequate assistance of
counsel cannot be defined or enforced without taking account of the central role plea bargaining
plays in securing convictions and determining sentences.” (citing Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct.
1399, 1407 (2012))).
325. Id. at 1384.
326. Compare id. at 1382 (suggesting that the court could require the state prosecutor to
reoffer the pre-trial plea offer), with id. at 1396 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (objecting that the reoffer
was an unprecedented remedy).
327. See supra Subsection I.C.2.
328. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (“An error by counsel, even if
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performance, a Strickland claim will fail if the defendant cannot show
prejudice, specifically that the defendant likely would have received a
shorter sentence or been convicted of a lesser charge.329 This outcomesbased prejudice analysis should encourage trial courts to normalize
outcomes at the trial stage. Professors Scott and Stuntz conceptualize
this market-based, outcomes approach based on contract and price
principles.330 Lafler and Frye incentivize this outcomes-based approach
based on Sixth Amendment principles.
In Lafler and Frye, the Supreme Court provided a green light to trial
courts to innovate reforms at the trial level, but it did not dictate a
procedural approach.331 As Professor Bibas suggests, the Court not only
encourages creativity but also may seek to avoid the type of rigid
constitutionalization of procedures that are a hallmark of trial
adjudication.332 As a practical matter, trial courts are not limited to
adopting a procedural approach, and are free to experiment with
outcomes monitoring.
Outcomes monitoring also reinforces courts’ traditional sentencing
authority. As discussed above, plea-bargaining effectively consolidates
judicial authority, including sentencing discretion, in the prosecutor.
Prosecutors constrain and influence sentencing discretion through
charging choices: by charging an offense that carries a statutory
mandatory minimum term, by charging more serious offenses to
influence the court’s assessment of a case, and by agreeing to
recommend a specific sentence as a term of the plea bargain.333 Though
courts typically impose the sentence at a separate proceeding, these
constraints on sentencing discretion often flow from the charge and
sentencing-bargaining that occurs earlier, before guilt adjudication.334
By the time of the sentencing hearing, it may be too late for courts to
consider a range of sentencing options.335 Monitoring outcomes at the
plea stage is one way for courts to assert their sentencing authority
when it may count most, before the plea, to maintain a stake in shaping
the final sentence.
Monitoring outcomes at the plea stage is consistent with current
sentencing practices. At sentencing, courts are expected to impose
sentences that are fair and proportionate in light of individualized,
professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal
proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.”).
329. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384–85.
330. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 164, at 1959–60.
331. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408–09 (2012).
332. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1152; Bibas, supra
note 20, at 173.
333. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 6, at 11.
334. See id.
335. Id. at 10–11.
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systemic, and comparative factors.336 A key goal of sentencing reforms
over the past several decades has been to ensure proportionality and
eliminate gross sentencing disparities from case to case and courtroom
to courtroom.337 Monitoring plea outcomes could foster similar
objectives by aligning courts’ incentives in accepting plea bargains with
sentencing goals. Monitoring plea outcomes resituates this inquiry to an
earlier stage or, stated differently, shifts the plea inquiry from processfocused to outcome-focused.
Courts have authority and incentives, especially after Lafler and
Frye, to monitor outcomes. As Professors Scott and Stuntz suggest,
monitoring outcomes is one way to gauge whether the plea-bargaining
market is functioning efficiently, or whether procedural concerns, such
as deficient counsel, are distorting negotiated results.338 Using outcomes
as a proxy for assessing other concerns (such as deficient counsel)
probes those issues indirectly. But this does not make the practice
improper. To the contrary, monitoring outcomes allows the court to
identify cases in which deficient performance may be a factor without
formally adjudicating that issue, delving into privileged client
communications, or engaging directly in plea-bargaining, which is
forbidden in some courts.339 For courts to implement this modified
approach to plea-bargaining, however, they must appreciate all that is at
stake—guilt adjudication, sentencing implications, and right to counsel
concerns—and have a firm grasp on the plea-bargaining marketplace.
B. A Blueprint for Monitoring
In practice, courts should monitor outcomes with three principles in
mind and target three categories of outcomes. Trial courts should aim to
ensure the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel,
check prosecutorial authority, and guard the court’s own discretion to
impose a just sentence that satisfies traditional sentencing goals. Trial
courts should focus their energies on monitoring plea outcomes that are
above market rates or contain mandatory minimum sentences. Trial
courts should also be alert to similar concerns in cases proceeding to
336. See, e.g., Traum, supra note 7, at 453–59 (discussing federal sentencing factors under
18 U.S.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)).
337. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 308 (2004) (referring to the “salutary
objectives” in Washington’s determinate sentencing scheme of ensuring “proportionality to the
gravity of the offense and parity among defendants”); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (listing as a factor
“the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar conduct”).
338. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 164, at 1959.
339. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (forbidding the court from participating in plea
negotiations); United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2149–50 (2013) (holding that the
magistrate violated FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) by advising defendant to accept a plea, and
remanding for harmless error analysis).
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A court’s inquiry should focus on three questions. First, guided by
the Sixth Amendment, a court should ask: Is this outcome distorted by
the defense lawyer’s incompetence, lack of skill or knowledge, or other
failures? Sixth Amendment violations may be especially likely to occur
where indigent defense systems are overburdened or quality of counsel
is variable.341 Defense lawyers working in such systems, with minimal
resources and high caseloads, face enormous pressure to get their clients
to plead guilty without investing much in the case.342 To guarantee the
right to the effective assistance of counsel and prevent unjust outcomes,
courts must be alert to how such pressures or related deficiencies (such
as a lawyer’s failure to communicate, investigate, or research) impact
the cases in their courtrooms.
Second, acting on separation of powers concerns, a court should ask:
Is this outcome skewed by prosecutorial advantage, vindictiveness, or
gamesmanship? It may be clear to the judge, for example, that some
prosecutors are especially aggressive or play hardball in negotiations.
Prosecutors, like defense counsel, will certainly vary. But as with
concerns about defense counsel, courts should aim to minimize the
prosecutor’s role as a determinative factor in shaping the outcome of the
case.
Finally, a court should ask: Will accepting this plea limit the court’s
discretion to impose a fair sentence that is individually tailored to this
defendant based on relevant sentencing factors? As discussed above,
this inquiry merely brings sentencing into the plea calculus. Courts
should be especially vigilant in monitoring guilty pleas that lead to
mandatory minimum sentences, which severely constrain their
sentencing discretion.343 Federal district courts are authorized to defer a
plea until the presentence report is available for the court to review.344
340. Post-trial sentences, as in Lafler, can be the product of ineffective assistance of
counsel in the plea phase, and are beyond the scope of this article. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.
Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012). For more on the trial penalty, see, for example, Ronald F. Wright, Trial
Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 84–85
(2005).
341. See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 444–48 (2009) (describing the proliferation of lawsuits
alleging that indigent defense providers systematically violate the Sixth Amendment).
342. Drinan, supra note 217, at 139.
343. In a 2010 survey, federal district judges attributed mandatory minimum sentencecharging by prosecutors as a leading cause of sentencing disparities. See U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES JANUARY 2010 THROUGH
MARCH 2010 tbls. 1, 16 (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/
Research_Projects/Surveys/20100608_Judge_Survey.pdf (reporting that 62% of judges view the
mandatory minimum sentences as too high and, along with charging decisions, as a cause of
sentencing disparities).
344. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A) (permitting courts to accept or reject a plea or defer
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This allows the court (as well as the defendant) to become fully aware
of sentencing options and consequences at the plea stage, before it is too
late.
To identify outlier results, courts will need to know “going rates” for
pleas in their jurisdiction. In Frye, the Court assumed that trial courts
are familiar with plea deals in their jurisdictions, and Professors Scott
and Stuntz similarly argue that courts are well positioned to know
market rates.345 If so, courts would recognize plea deals that are within
the normal range and those that seem too high. The extent to which
judges actually possess such knowledge is unclear, and answering this
question would require empirical study of what knowledge judges
actually have when accepting pleas or imposing sentences. Studies on
sentencing disparities within the same courthouse suggest that outcomes
vary by courtroom, and sentencing data on codefendants is not readily
accessible.346 Thus, even if judges have acquired expertise in their own
courtrooms, they may lack knowledge about market rates more broadly.
A court could begin its outcome monitoring before the plea hearing
by seeking two sources of information: the history of plea offers in the
case and a range of data on going rates or plea results in similar cases
within the jurisdiction. Even the most basic plea history would avoid a
Frye problem and provide insight into how the prosecutor has valued
the case over time. This would help the court analyze whether the
contemplated plea bargain and sentence is tailored to the gravity of the
defendant’s conduct and history. A plea history driven by procedural
factors, like delays in responding to a plea offer, might flag problems
with defense counsel similar to those that occurred in Frye.347
Information about similar cases would inform courts on local market
rates. Ideally, defense attorneys, prosecutors, or an arm of the court
would maintain this data on a local basis.348 Collecting and maintaining
data on going rates for pleas would require considerable work, but could
acceptance until the court has received the presentence report).
345. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1410 (2012); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 164, at
1959 (referring to “going market price”).
346. See United States v. Garrison, 560 F. Supp. 2d 83, 84 (D. Mass. 2008) (describing
barriers to obtaining sentencing information on related cases within the same district); Ryan W.
Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 21–23
(2010) (analyzing inter-judge sentencing disparities from 2001 to 2008, based on sentencing
data from the District of Massachusetts).
347. 132 S. Ct. at 1404 (describing problems with defense counsel).
348. See, e.g., Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
261, 275–79 (citing Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public
Safety Through State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1389, 1412–15 (2008) (calling for a
“what works” literature and data on sentencing options that reduce recidivism); Wolff, supra, at
1412–15 (describing empirical data collected by specialized courts in order to more effectively
sentence offenders).
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prove extremely useful to courts, defendants, and defense counsel in
evaluating cases, plea offers, and plea bargains. Disseminating this
information for use in plea-bargaining could foster the core values of
due process, transparency, proportionality, and predictability for the
parties, the courts, and the broader public.
Going rate data could benefit defendants and defense counsel both
inside and outside the courtroom. By sharing this information with the
defendant, defense counsel could help his client evaluate the plea offer
and informally assess the counsel’s performance. Getting defendants to
appreciate the plea benefits and trial risks is a major hurdle for defense
counsel.349 Defendants’ ability to assess the plea offer is often impaired
by lack of trust in defense counsel; underestimation of the likelihood of
conviction and related penalties; and other factors, such as stress and
mental impairment.350 Better information about plea bargains in other
cases would be a powerful tool for defendants and their counsel to use
when evaluating plea offers before they come to court.
In court, a judge might use this wealth of information about the
market to assess defense counsel’s handling of the case. For example,
defense counsel might justify the plea or explain why the prosecutor’s
plea offer is too high in light of the facts. Either response would likely
expose counsel’s knowledge of the defendant’s case or the plea market
generally, both of which are relevant to the quality of representation. In
most cases, this interaction with counsel would allow the court to gauge
if the plea is within the range of market rates and detect possible issues
of ineffective counsel and prosecutorial overreaching. If the plea seems
too high, the court could reject the plea, defer the plea hearing (pending
further negotiations or preparation of a presentence report), or request
more information about the case or the going rate.
Cases proceeding to trial are ripe for outcomes monitoring. Trial
cases are so rare, accounting for roughly 5% of convictions, that courts
have reason to question in each one of these cases whether prosecutorial
overreaching or ineffective assistance of counsel has contributed to the
defendant’s decision to risk trial and with it the harsher sentence or
“trial penalty.”351 This “trial penalty” reflects a mixture of procedural
349. Blume, supra note 23, at 123.
350. Id. (listing factors that contributed to capital defendants’ rejection of plea offers).
351. See Jenny M. Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2674
(2013) (citing Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Sentencing Shift Gives New Leverage to Prosecutors, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/us/tough-sentences-helpprosecutors-push-for-plea-bargains.html (defining the “trial penalty” as the “fact that the
sentences for people who go to trial have grown harsher relative to sentences for those who
agree to a plea”)); see also Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea
Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 603–04 (2014)
(citing, inter alia, Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in
Sentences After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM.
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and substantive factors that influence the prosecutor to seek and the
court to impose a more severe sentence after trial.352 As Lafler makes
clear, however, some defendants proceed to trial, risking the trial
penalty, because incompetent counsel caused them to reject a plea
offer.353 Trial courts that are alert to this possibility could take steps to
guard against it.
To monitor outcomes before trial, courts also should require a pretrial history, and take additional steps to quantify the trial penalty.354 As
in plea cases, a pre-trial history that includes any plea offers would
ensure that earlier offers were communicated to the defendant, and
inform the court on how the prosecution valued the case during the
plea-bargaining phase. Ahead of a trial, this information would frame
the trial penalty, especially if any new charges carry minimum or
maximum penalties. Courts could take steps to quantify and cabin the
trial penalty, so that the trial risks are clear and not disproportionate.355
Taking these steps before trial would ensure that the trial penalty is
transparent to the court and the defendant, which could temper the
severity of the trial penalty.
Though adding a data-driven component to the plea-bargaining
process offers much utility, it also presents some risks. For example, the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines were developed using prior sentencing
data that was analyzed to track and derive relevant sentencing factors
based on the defendant’s conduct and history.356 This approach
reinforced values of uniformity and predictability, and constrained
judicial discretion, especially before 2005, when the guidelines were
L. REV. 959, 992 (2005) (detailing the wide range of trial penalties)).
352. The prosecutor may charge the case more aggressively, Richard A. Bierschbach &
Stephanos Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring Punishment, 112 MICH. L. REV. 397, 438 (2013)
(describing how prosecutors threaten higher charges during plea-bargaining and, if there is no
plea, feel compelled to follow through with them at trial); and portray the crime and the
defendant in a more negative light than if the defendant had pled guilty, factors that may
influence the court’s sentencing determination, see King et al., supra note 351, at 964
(suggesting that one factor in higher sentences after jury trial is judges’ exposure to negative
information at trial about the defendant that the judge would not have seen or heard had the
defendant pled guilty).
353. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1390–91.
354. See Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based
Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1237 (2008) (advocating use of “plea-based ceilings” to limit
the severity of the trial penalty).
355. Id. at 1237 (arguing that courts should fix the trial penalty using plea-based sentences
as the baseline); see also Lafler, 132 S. Ct at 1387 (implying that plea-based sentences are the
norm and post-trial sentences the exception).
356. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, at 4 (2012), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2012_Guidelines/Manual_PDF/Chapter_1.pdf (describing how
initial guidelines were developed by analyzing “data drawn from 10,000 presentence
investigations”). Advocates of evidence-based sentencing instead focus on which kinds of
sentences actually impede future criminal behavior. See Wolff, supra note 348, at 1412–15.
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still mandatory.357 But some have criticized the guidelines for being too
“rigid” and impeding the ability of judges to tailor sentences based on
individualized factors.358 In plea-bargaining, going rate information
could be used to the same effect, by rigidly defining plea ranges,
masking nuances that might justify different bargains for a similar
offense, or eliminating judicial oversight for pleas that fall within the
going rate.
Relying on going rates to monitor outcomes at the plea stage is not
intended to introduce a plea-bargaining version of the sentencing
guidelines that displaces, rather than improves, judicial oversight of
guilty plea adjudication. To the contrary, monitoring outcomes based on
going rates is an informal method that allows courts to engage in the
substantive content of pleas with a principled purpose. Some courts may
already do this, but most focus, as required, on the procedural aspects of
the plea. Outcomes monitoring invites courts to “eyeball” the plea and
put their market expertise to work in identifying plea outcomes that
might be distorted by ineffective counsel or prosecutorial advantage.
Better data on pleas would enhance courts’ capacity to understand the
plea market and monitor outcomes.
Judicial review of pleas can incorporate baseline assumptions about
plea-bargaining and operate as a constitutional and institutional check
on the process. Even in a healthy market, outcomes will vary
considerably and in ways that should not sound alarms. Each case is
different. Well-meaning prosecutors and competent defense counsel
reach a range of agreements. The goal is not to destroy the market, but
to harness its strengths in order to identify factors, especially ineffective
counsel and prosecutorial overreaching, which can impede the parties’
ability to negotiate fair results. This goal is both theoretical and
practical: to provide courts a meaningful role in regulating pleabargaining that injects constitutional checks into the plea-bargaining
market.
CONCLUSION
Lafler and Frye shift the framework for regulation of guilty pleas
and, importantly, begin the process of reframing constitutional doctrine
to fit our “system of pleas.” These cases establish that courts enjoy
357. Erik Luna, Rage Against the Machine: A Reply to Professors Bierschbach and Bibas,
97 MINN. L. REV. 2245, 2263 (2013) (critiquing federal sentencing guidelines as “rigid” and
“mechanical”); Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 537, 543 (2012) (arguing that federal guidelines continue to be rigidly applied
after being made “advisory” in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)).
358. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 357, at 543; Kate Stith, Principles, Pragmatism, and
Politics: The Evolution of Washington State’s Sentencing Guidelines, 76 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no.1, 2013, at 105, 105–07.
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robust authority to protect defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel in plea-bargaining and remedy
violations. While Lafler and Frye considered these doctrinal points in
the context of post-conviction challenges under Strickland v.
Washington, their significance is broader. They confirm that substantive
outcomes, not just procedural values, are important to assessing and
remedying prejudice caused by deficient counsel. These cases also
powerfully signal that the locus of plea reform must be in the trial
courts, where judges know the market for plea bargains and are best
situated to identify and correct ineffective assistance before it prejudices
the outcome.
Lafler and Frye begin the broader task of reorienting constitutional
doctrine to fit guilty plea adjudication in ways that are consistent with
core constitutional values and courts’ traditional role in checking
prosecutorial authority. Judicial monitoring of plea outcomes leverages
the courts’ constitutional role in the plea-bargaining market, with courts
playing a pivotal role in detecting and correcting outcomes that are
distorted by prosecutorial advantage or ineffective counsel. This
approach also reinforces courts’ traditional sentencing authority and
properly directs the judicial inquiry to focus on the substantive (not
merely the procedural) outcome of the case. The blueprint described
here suggests how courts can implement this approach in practical
terms. The biggest challenge will be getting courts to embrace an
enhanced, substantive role in regulating guilty pleas, which departs
from their current procedural approach.

